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REQUIEM FOR A LIGHTWEIGHT: HOW NCAA
CONTINUES TO DISTORT ANTITRUST DOCTRINE
Alan J. Meese*

The Supreme Court speaks rarely about the meaning of
When the Court does speak, its
the Sherman Act.
pronouncements have particular resonance and staying
power amongjurists, scholars, and enforcers. NCAA v. Board
of Regents of the University of Oklahoma was such a case.
There the Court assessed agreements reducing the output and
increasing the prices of televised college football games. After
announcing that restraints imposed by sports leagues are
exempt from per se condemnation, the Court went on to
invalidate the challenged agreements under the rule of reason
because they produced significant economic harm without
offsetting benefits. In so doing, the Justices also addressed
restraints not before the Court, opining that members of the
NCAA may collectively restrict the level of compensation that
universitiesprovide student-athletes.
Announced almost four decades ago, NCAA and its
rationale have exerted substantialinfluence on the Sherman
Act doctrine, enforcement policy, and scholarly discoursewell
beyond the context of sports leagues. Recently, in NCAA v.
Alston, the Court revisited the antitrustpropriety of collective
limitationson the compensation schools pay student-athletes.
There the Court reviewed the Ninth Circuit'scondemnation of
NCAA regulations restricting the value of education-related
benefits, such as post-graduationscholarships, that schools
provide student-athletes in addition to tuition, room, board,
and other costs of attendance.
While antitrustscholarsandpractitionersdisagreeabout
the merits of the Ninth Circuit'sdecision, all hoped the Court
would clarify the extent to which the NCAA may limit
student-athlete compensation. This Article contends that
Alston also presented the Court with an opportunity to
address more fundamental questions. That is, the case
offered the Court a chance to correct NCAA's erroneous
application of the per se standard and derivative errors the
* Ball Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for the Study of Law and
Markets, William & Mary Law School.
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Court committed when conducting rule of reason analysisreverberate throughout Sherman Act
errors that
jurisprudence.
In particular, the Article demonstrates that NCAA's
sports league exemption from the ordinary per se standard
Moreover, the
contradicts basic antitrust principles.
rationale for the exemption turned partly on the Court's
(correct) assertion that some horizontal restraints can
overcome market failures and enhance interbrand
Recognition of these potential benefits
competition.
undermined the Court's otherwise broad articulationof the
per se rule that purportedly created the need for such an
exemption in the first place.
Failure to condemn the restraints before it as unlawful
per se also distorted the Court's pronouncements regarding
how to conduct rule of reason analysis. For instance, the
requirements for establishing a prima facie case should
depend upon the nature of redeeming virtues a restraint
might produce. However, courts, agencies, and scholars have
read NCAA as holding that proof that a restraintproduces
prices exceeding the nonrestraint baseline necessarily
establishessuch a case, even when the restraintmay overcome
a market failure. Moreover, lower courts, agencies, and the
Court itself have read NCAA as endorsing a "Quick Look"
approach in some rule of reason cases, allowingplaintiffs to
bypass any requirement to establish anticompetitive harm.
Finally, the Court's approach to rule of reason analysis lent
credence to the dubious assumption that benefits produced by
challenged restraints necessarily coexist with harms,
bolstering the equally dubious less restrictivealternative test.
However, the Courtfailed to take the opportunity in Alston to
correct these errors and ensure a more coherent Section 1
jurisprudence that better reflects the teachings of modern
economic theory.
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INTRODUCTION

Section 1 of the Sherman Act potentially governs most
contractual activity in the nation's economy, and the Supreme Court
has the final word on the statute's meaning and application. Still,
very few antitrust controversies reach the Supreme Court.1 When the
Court does consider a Section 1 case, it usually confines itself to
determining whether a particular category of restraint is unlawful
2
per se and thus not properly subject to rule of reason analysis. The
Court's rare Section 1 pronouncements, whether about the per se rule
or the methodology for assessing restraints under the rule of reason,
have particular resonance and staying power among jurists, scholars,
and enforcers.
Decided almost four decades ago by an entirely different Court,
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma3 exemplifies
1. See Mark S. Popofsky & Douglas H. Hallward-Driemeier, Antitrust and
the Roberts Court, 28 ANTITRUST L.J. 26, 26 (2014) (reporting that the Supreme
Court heard only nineteen antitrust cases between 1993 and 2014). It should be
noted that only some of these cases involved interpretation of Section 1 of the
Sherman Act and thus the content of the rule of reason.
2. See Alan J. Meese, In Praise of All or Nothing Dichotomous Categories:
Why Antitrust Law Should Reject the Quick Look, 104 GEO. L.J. 835, 853 (2016)
("The Supreme Court has declined to articulate a comprehensive methodology for
conducting full-blown rule of reason analysis, leaving lower courts and
enforcement agencies to fill in the gaps and articulate the precise standards
governing this analysis.").
3. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).

1106

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

such a rare, influential decision. 4 Of course, in the popular mind, the
case has stood for the proposition, which some consider dicta, that
colleges and universities may collectively decide not to pay studentathletes more than the cost of attendance for attending the schools
where they matriculate, thereby preserving the "amateur" status of
such participants. 5 Scholars and lower courts continue to disagree
about the implications of this statement and how to assess
restrictions on student athlete compensation under the rule of reason.
For instance, some lower courts have read this language as holding
that limits on student-athlete compensation are lawful per se, while
others have rejected this conclusion. 6 The Supreme Court revisited
the issue of student-athlete compensation this most recent term, in
NCAA v. Alston.7 There the Court reviewed and affirmed the Ninth
Circuit's invalidation of the NCAA's restrictions on education-related
benefits that schools may provide to student-athletes over and above
tuition, room, board, and other costs of attendance. 8
Alston certainly clarified the application of NCAA and Section 1
to a particular form of student-athlete compensation, 9 but Alston
provided the Court with an opportunity to address more fundamental
questions raised by NCAA. That is, the case offered the Court a
chance to correct NCAA's erroneous application of the per se standard
and derivative errors the Court committed when conducting rule of
reason analysis, errors that have reverberated well beyond the sports
league context. 10 Unfortunately, Alston missed these opportunities,
leaving in place and even bolstering most of NCAA's mistakes. NCAA
will thus continue to exercise significant influence over Section 1
doctrine, both inside and outside the context of sports leagues.

4. See generally id.
5. See id. at 101-02; see also Cameron D. Ginder, Note, NCAA and the Rule
of Reason: Analyzing Improved Education Quality as a Procompetitive
Justification, 57 WM. & MARY L. REv. 675, 686 (2015) ("Justice Stevens's
comments on compensation were mere dicta.").
6. Compare Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498, 501-02 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting
NCAA decision in holding that NCAA Bylaws "clearly meant to help maintain
the 'revered tradition of amateurism in college sports' or the 'preservation of the
student-athlete in higher education"' are lawfulper se); Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d
328, 342-43 (7th Cir. 2012) (same), with O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049,
1063-64 (9th Cir. 2015) (rejecting this approach and assessing such restrictions
under the rule of reason). See also Ginder, supra note 5, at 687 ("Justice Stevens's
dicta and lower court decisions notwithstanding, there is no per se rule of legality
for NCAA restraints on compensation .... "); id. (rejecting decisions such as
Agnew holding that limits on student-athlete compensation are lawful per se).
7. 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021).
8. Id. at 2165-66.
9. See id.
10. See Herbert J. Hovenkamp, The NCAA and the Rule of Reason, 52 REV.
INDUS. ORG. 323, 325-27 (2017).
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Ironically, the restraints challenged in NCAA had nothing to do
with student-athlete compensation. Instead, the Court evaluated a
horizontal agreement to reduce the number of televised college
football games and increase the price that members charged networks
to broadcast such contests.11 Under ordinary Section 1 analysis,
courts summarily condemn as "unlawful per se" any agreement that
restrains rivalry between parties to it, unless the arrangement
displays the potential to create "redeeming virtues" in the form of
This standard parallels the
productive or other efficiencies. 12
ancillary restraints doctrine, which condemns agreements as "naked"
horizontal agreements when they are accompanied by an otherwise
legitimate venture but show no prospect of enhancing the efficiency
of the enterprise. 13 Application of this doctrine requires courts and
agencies to assess whether challenged restraints may produce
efficiencies, an inquiry analogous to that undertaken when tribunals
determine whether restraints in a given category might produce
redeeming virtues.1 4

For three decades leading up to NCAA, the Court had adopted a
very narrow definition of "redeeming virtues" when assessing
horizontal restraints.1 5 The Court had thus condemned some
restraints that appeared ancillary because they might have advanced
legitimate objectives of otherwise valid ventures. Most notably, in
United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 16 the Court condemned as
unlawful per se horizontal allocations of exclusive territories, even
though these restraints showed the potential to create significant
benefits and were thus ancillary to a legitimate venture. 17 The Court
subsequently reaffirmed Topco, and the NCAA's explicit restraints on
price and output seemed ripe for condemnation under these recent
applications of the per se standard. 18
Contrary to the dictates of then-current precedent, NCAA held
that the apparently naked restraints on price and output of broadcast
games were not unlawful per se. 19 Sports leagues, the Court said,
11. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 91-95 (1984)
(describing the agreement behind the controversy).
12. See Alan J. Meese, Will the Supreme Court Recover Its Own Fumble? How
Alston Can Repair the Damage Resultingfrom NCAA's Sports League Exemption,
11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ONLINE 70, 71-73 (2021).
13. See id. at 76-81.
14. See id. at 74-75.
15. See id. at 74.
16. 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
17. Id. at 610-12.
18. See infra Subpart I.B (explaining how Topco and other pre-NCAA
decisions articulated and applied broad per se rule against horizontal restraints);
Eugene F. Zelek, Jr. et al., A Rule of Reason Decision Model After Sylvania, 68
CALIF. L. REV. 13, 24-25 (1980) ("The Court's treatment of Topco confirms the
belief that horizontal arrangements unreasonably restrict competition.").
19. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,100-01 (1984).
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necessarily required some horizontal cooperation to function in the
first place, while other (optional) cooperation could enhance the
quality of venture products 20 In the context of intercollegiate
athletics, the Court said, the second form of cooperation could include
horizontal limits on competition for the services of student-athletes. 2 1
While such cooperation was perhaps not necessary to create and
operate such a league, these restraints could protect and reinforce the
amateur nature of intercollegiate competition, a component of the
NCAA's brand. While such restraints reduced rivalry in one part of
the market, they could also overcome a market failure and thus
enhance interbrand competition between college athletics and other
The favorable invocation of these
forms of live entertainment.
restraints not before the Court necessarily implied that such
agreements would survive per se condemnation.
Because some restraints imposed by the NCAA could be
reasonable, the Court said, all restraints imposed by sports leagues
were immune from per se condemnation, regardless of whether
proponents of challenged restraints could identify any redeeming
virtues that such restraints may produce. 22 At the same time, the
Court reaffirmed prior decisions, including Topco, that had
condemned as unlawful per se horizontal restraints that had
appeared capable of producing significant economic benefits. 23 Thus,
the decision articulated an overall Section 1 regime that broadly and
summarily condemned as unlawful per se most horizontal restraints
(including some restraints historically deemed "ancillary" and
therefore traditionally assessed under the rule of reason) but that
simultaneously exempted all restraints imposed by sports leagues
from this per se ban.
Departing from its ordinary practice, the Court went on to assess
the restraints under the rule of reason, finding that they produced
significant competitive harm without any offsetting benefits. 2 4 In so
doing, the Court rejected the NCAA's contention that proof of market
power was necessary to establish a prima facie case, relying instead
on the district court's findings that the restraints produced actual
detrimental effects by reducing output and increasing prices
compared to a nonrestraint baseline that is purely hypothetical. 25
Both sets of pronouncements-the per se standard and the rule
of reason-have exerted substantial influence on the Sherman Act
doctrine, enforcement policy, and scholarly discourse well beyond the
context of amateur and professional sports. Indeed, the decision has
inspired, perhaps inadvertently, a third approach to Section 1
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 101-02.
See id.
See id. at 100-03.
Id. at 98-100.
Id. at 104-20.
Id. at 109-10, 119-20.
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analysis; the "Quick Look." Under this approach, plaintiffs may
establish a prima facie case against certain restraints that avoid per
se condemnation without adducing evidence of harm. 26 Even if
defendants rebut the prima facie case by introducing evidence that
the restraint produces significant benefits, the plaintiffs may
nonetheless prevail by establishing that the defendants could have
achieved the same benefits via a less restrictive means. 2 7
This Article contends that NCAA's sports league exemption from
the ordinary per se standard-which Alston did not questioncontradicts basic antitrust principles. Any number of ventures,
including garden variety partnerships or even the venture in Topco,
require some reasonable horizontal cooperation to function and
thrive. Even so, restraints that accompany such ventures are not
immune from summary condemnation. Instead, courts and agencies
have evaluated such agreements under the ancillary restraints
doctrine, condemning those contracts that display no potential to
enhance the venture's efficiency. 28
NCAA did not mention the ancillary restraints doctrine or
explain why it ignored this test, which the lower court had expressly
applied, nor did the decision mention the test for per se illegality or
29
identify any redeeming virtues that the restraint might create.
Moreover, while the Court purported to reaffirm Topco and similar
decisions, its conclusion that some restraints not before it were likely
reasonable because they overcame a market failure and enhanced
interbrand competition contradicted Topco's rationale and implicitly
narrowed the very per se rule from which the Court exempted
restraints imposed by sports leagues. Put another way, the rationale
for NCAA's sports league exemption tacitly undermined the very
decisions that purportedly gave rise to the need for such an exemption
in the first place.
The decision's pronouncements regarding how to establish a
prima facie case under the rule of reason and dicta that inspired the
"Quick Look" fare no better. Indeed, these two errors apparently
followed from the former, that is, the Court's decision to exempt any
and all sports league restraints from per se condemnation. After all,
the proper methodology for establishing a prima facie case should
turn upon the nature of the redeeming virtues that a restraint might
produce. Where a restraint avoids per se condemnation because it
might overcome a market failure, proof that it expressly sets prices or
actually increases prices above a prerestraint baseline may simply
confirm that the restraint corrects a poorly functioning market and
thus should not itself establish a prima facie case. The restraint
26. Meese, supra note 2, at 855-58.
27. Id. at 858-59.
28. See Meese, supra note 12, at 75-77.
29. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1153-56 (10th
Cir. 1983), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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before the Court displayed no potential to create redeeming virtues,
let alone virtues that entailed elimination of a market failure.
Because there was thus no conceivable benign or beneficial
explanation for the price increase, the Court naturally interpreted
this increase as strong evidence of anticompetitive harm. 30
Such an approach would likely produce accurate results when
applied to restraints, such as those in NCAA itself, that apparently
cannot produce redeeming virtues. In such cases, reliance upon
actual detrimental effects or the "Quick Look" to establish a prima
facie case will simply replicate the result produced by correct
application of the per se rule, so long as plaintiffs are willing and able
to incur the expense necessary to establish that, say, the challenged
restraint produces anticompetitive harm. However, neither NCAA
itself nor subsequent decisions that have invoked the "Quick Look" or
the actual detrimental effects test have confined application of these
methods to restraints that appear incapable of producing redeeming
virtues.
Unlike the restraint in NCAA, most forms of partial contractual
integration that survive per se condemnation do so precisely because
they may produce redeeming virtues by overcoming a market failure.
Thus, the restraints before the Court, which NCAA exempted from
per se condemnation without identifying any redeeming virtues, were
not representative of those that courts assess under the rule of reason.
Subsequent courts, scholars, and enforcement agencies erred,
however, in generalizing this methodology-developed in a
nonrepresentative case-to all rule of reason cases, thereby rendering
it too easy for plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case and cast upon
defendants an expensive burden of production. The result has been
more than three decades of doctrinal evolution and scholarly dialogue
premised upon an idiosyncratic and misleading application of the rule
of reason.
NCAA's errors loomed particularly large as the Alston Court
reconsidered the Sherman Act's treatment of the NCAA's limits on
student-athlete compensation. The Alston case provided the Court
with a perfect opportunity to correct NCAA's errors and ensure a more
coherent Section 1 jurisprudence that better reflects the teachings of
modern economic theory. 31 Unfortunately the Court fumbled this
32
opportunity, leaving NCAA's erroneous approach largely in place.

30. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 120.
31. See Meese, supra note 12, at 71, 84-91 (describing what the Supreme
Court could have done in Alston).
32. See, e.g., Sarah Eberspacher & Martin D. Edel, National Collegiate
Athletic Association v. Alston: Supreme Court Sides with Student-Athletes in
NCAA v. Alston, Expands Permissible Types of Compensation, NAT'L L. REV.
(June 21, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/national-collegiateathletic-association-v-alston (noting that by affirming the Ninth Circuit's
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The result and reasoning of Alston exemplified the staying power of
NCAA's sports league exemption and subsequent errors that the
exemption inspired.
Part I recounts the state of the law regarding the scope of the per
se rule before NCAA. Part II describes the Court's surprising refusal
to condemn the restraints before it as unlawful per se. Part III
critiques the sports league exemption the Court fashioned to shelter
the challenged restraints from ordinary per se standards. Part IV
scrutinizes the Court's endorsement of the actual detrimental effects
approach to establishing a prima facie case as well as the dicta that
gave rise to the "Quick Look," exploring and assessing both aspects of
the decision and its progeny. A brief conclusion follows and explores
the implications of this Article's critiques.
I. PRE-NCAA CASE LAW ON THE SCOPE OF THE PER SE RULE

A.

General Per Se Standards

To understand how NCAA went wrong, one must first review the
state of the law governing horizontal restraints in 1984, including the
per se rule and the standards governing its implementation.
Beginning with Standard Oil Co. v. United States,33 the Court has
long held that Section 1 only prohibits "unreasonable" restraints. 34
Restraints were unreasonable, the Court said, if they unduly
restrained interstate commerce by producing a monopoly or the
consequences of a monopoly, namely higher prices, reduced output,
and/or lower quality. 35 Application of this standard required courts
to apply evolving economic conceptions when determining whether
36
challenged restraints produced these prohibited effects.

decision, the Court also reaffirmed the usage of the three-part "rule of reason"
analysis in the college and university sports league context).
33. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
34. See generally id. See also Nat'l Soc'y of Pro. Eng'rs v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 690, 695 (1978) (endorsing and elaborating upon Standard Oil); Cont'l
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (citing Standard Oil, 221
U.S. 1) ("Since the early years of this century, a judicial gloss on this statutory
language has established the 'rule of reason' as the prevailing standard of
analysis.").
35. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 52, 58 (listing three "evils" which led to
public outcry against monopolies in England and concluding that identical
concerns motivated American common law); see also Alan J. Meese, Price Theory,
Competition, and the Rule of Reason, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 77, 87-89 (2003)
(describing Standard Oil's holding that Section 1 forbids only those agreements
that produce monopoly or evils of monopoly, namely, higher prices, reduced
output, or reduced quality).

36. See Meese, supranote 35, at 90-92 (explaining how Standard Oil's rule
of reason required courts to adjust antitrust doctrine in response to evolving
economic theory).
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Ordinarily, rule of reason analysis is a fact-intensive exercise,
with courts examining various factors bearing upon the impact of the
challenged restraint. 37 However, even before Standard Oil, thenJudge and future Chief Justice William Howard Taft had opined that
horizontal restraints that were not "ancillary" to some other
legitimate venture but instead had the "sole object . .. to restrain
competition, and enhance or maintain prices" were automatically
unlawful, regardless of actual economic impact. 38
Moreover,
Standard Oil itself had suggested that courts should condemn some
restraints as unreasonable based simply on their "nature or
character." 39 The Court subsequently drew upon these suggestions,
holding that certain types of restraints were unreasonable without
more. 40 Such "per se rules" were categorical in nature, requiring
summary condemnation of all agreements, without exception, that
satisfied the criteria for inclusion in the relevant category, even if

37. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979)
(noting that rule of reason is "generally applied in Sherman Act cases"); White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963) ("[StandardOil's] rule of
reason normally requires an ascertainment of the facts peculiar to the particular
business."); see also Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49 ("Under this rule, the factfinder
weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition."); id.
at 49-50, n.15 ("One of the most frequently cited statements of the rule of reason
is that of Mr. Justice Brandeis in [Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States], 246 U.S.
231, 238 (1918): 'The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates, and perhaps thereby promotes, competition, or whether it is
such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To determine that question,
the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the
restraint is applied; its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the
nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy,
the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not
because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the
reverse, but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts
and to predict consequences."').
38. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 282-83 (6th
Cir. 1898).
39. See Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at 58.
40. See Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 211 (1959)
("[Standard Oil] emphasized, however, that there were classes of restraints
which, from their 'nature or character' were unduly restrictive, and hence
forbidden by both the common law and the statute.") (citing Standard Oil, 221
U.S. at 58, 65); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213
(1951) (describing agreements "raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing
the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce" as illegal per se);
United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273 U.S. 392, 398-99 (1927) (citing Addyston
Pipefor the proposition that horizontal price fixing between firms "controlling in
any substantial manner a trade or business in interstate commerce" is
unreasonable).
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particular agreements that fell into the category were harmless or
produced net benefits. 4 1
More than twenty-five years before NCAA, in Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. United States ("NPR"),42 the Court articulated the
definitive standard governing whether a particular category of
agreement is unlawful per se. 4 3 The Court announced that a category
must satisfy two distinct conditions to merit per se condemnation.
First, agreements in the category must have a "pernicious effect on
competition." 44 Second, the agreements must "lack any redeeming
virtue."45 Agreements that satisfy both conditions, the Court said,
are "conclusively presumed to be unreasonable" without any showing
of harm or case-by-case opportunity for defendants to establish any
"business excuse." 46
When applying the first part of the test, the Court effectively
equated "competition" with atomistic rivalry, treating the impact of a
restraint as "pernicious" whenever it reduced such rivalry without
41. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-46,
351-52 (1982); United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610-12 (1972)
(finding that challenged restraint was unlawful per se regardless of potential
positive impact on interbrand competition and lack of significant harm).
42. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
43. Id. at 5.
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 264-65
(1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting the NPR standard and explaining that
"inherently suspect" agreements are only unlawful per se if "every form of such
restraint is utterly without justification").

46. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) ("[T]here are certain
agreements or practices which, because of their pernicious effect on competition
and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable
and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have
caused or the business excuse for their use."); see also Catalano, Inc. v. Target
Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 646 (1980); Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977) (quoting NPR test as definitive statement of per se rule);
Topco, 405 U.S. at 607 (same); White Motor, 372 U.S. at 262-64 (applying NPR
test and rejecting per se condemnation for vertical customer allocation
agreement); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 8 (1979)
("[T]he Court has held that certain agreements or practices are so 'plainly
anticompetitive,' and so often 'lack .. . any redeeming virtue,' that they are
conclusively presumed illegal without further examination under the rule of
reason .... " (internal citations omitted)). More recently the Court has continued
to endorse the NPR test. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) ("Some
types of restraints, however, have such predictable and pernicious
anticompetitive effect, and such limited potential for procompetitive benefit, that
they are deemed unlawful per se."); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v.
PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (articulating and applying test to minimum
resale price maintenance agreements and refusing to condemn such restraints as
unlawful per se). It should be noted that, so far as this author is aware, no opinion
by Justice Stevens, the author of NCAA, invoked the NPR test for determining
whether a category of restraint is unlawful per se.
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assessing whether the restraint would produce economic harm. 47
Because contracts by their nature restrict individual autonomy, 4 8
many agreements limit rivalry in a manner that produces the sort of
"pernicious" effect on atomistic competition that satisfies this first
prong. 4 9 As a result, designation of a category as "unlawful per se" or
not has almost always turned on whether agreements in the category
might produce "redeeming virtues." 50
Defendants can always identify some aspect of challenged
Such self-serving
agreements that they consider "redeeming."
assertions do not prevent per se condemnation. 5 1 Instead, defendants
must identify some benefit to society that such restraints might
produce, such as reduced production costs or reduction in the cost of
52
employing imperfect markets to conduct economic activity.

47. See Meese, supra note 35, at 94 ("Plaintiffs can readily satisfy the first
prong of this test, given the manner in which the Court defines anticompetitive
when conducting per se analysis. Like Standard Oil, the Court has abjured any
technical definition of competition and instead equated the term with 'rivalry' for
the purpose of per se analysis, with the result that any coordination of previously
independent activity is anticompetitive.").
48. See Nat'l Soc'y of Pro. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 687-88
(1978) ("[A]s Mr. Justice Brandeis perceptively noted, restraint is the very
essence of every contract; read literally, § 1 would outlaw the entire body of
private contract law. Yet it is that body of law that establishes the enforceability
of commercial agreements and enables competitive markets-indeed, a
competitive economy-to function effectively.") (citing Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)); see also Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53 n.21 (invoking
recognition by Justice Brandeis that contracts necessarily restrict parties to them
to reject contention that Section 1 should ban agreements that restrict the
"autonomy of independent businessmen").
49. See Meese, supra note 35, at 94-95 ("This definition of anticompetitive
sweeps quite broadly, applying as it does to any number of garden variety
arrangements. The formation of a partnership or a corporation, for instance,
necessarily eliminates actual or potential rivalry between the parties to the new
venture.").

50. See id. at 96 ("[G]iven the breadth with which the Court defines
anticompetitive, it is the second portion of this test that saves most restrictions
on rivalry from automatic condemnation .... ").
51. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn, & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 375 (1967)
("[E]very restrictive practice is designed to augment the profit and competitive
position of its participants. Price fixing does so, for example, and so may a wellcalculated division of territories.").
52. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-57 (treating propensity of restraints to
induce optimal promotional investments by dealers as redeeming virtue for the
purpose of per se analysis); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 30607 (1949) (detailing potential benefits of requirements contracts, including
reduced selling and storage costs); id. at 307-08 (concluding that the prospect of
such benefits precluded automatic condemnation without inquiry into
defendants' market position); see also John M. Newman, Procompetitive
Justificationsin Antitrust Law, 94 IND. L.J. 501, 540-42 (2019).
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The disparate treatment of partnerships and naked horizontal
price fixing illustrates application of the NPR framework,
particularly the role played by the possibility of redeeming virtues or
lack thereof. Horizontal price fixing unrelated to a valid venture is
unlawful per se because such conduct (1) always reduces rivalry and
The second conclusion
(2) never produces redeeming virtues.5 3
follows from the Court's determination that a restraint's propensity
to set reasonable prices, although redeeming from the perspective of
defendants, is not a cognizable benefit and thus is not a redeeming
virtue under the Sherman Act. 54
Of course, the formation of partnerships and horizontal mergers
between previously independent firms also eliminates atomistic
rivalry and thus produces a "pernicious effect on competition" as the
Court has defined this phrase. 55 However, even when the scope of the
per se rule was at its maximum, courts declined to condemn such
transactions as unlawful per se for obvious reasons; namely, such
transactions may produce redeeming virtues in the form of productive
or other efficiencies and thus do not satisfy the second part of the per
se test. 56 Thus, the prospect of cognizable benefits, and not any

53. See Meese, supra note 35, at 96-98; see also Thomas G. Krattenmaker,
Per Se Violations in Antitrust Law: Confusing Offenses with Defenses, 77 GEO.
L.J. 165, 171-72 (1988).
54. See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) ("It
is no excuse that the prices fixed are themselves reasonable."); see also, e.g., Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Superior Ct. Trial Laws. Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990) quoting
Catalano); Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 349-50 n.22
(1982) (same); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 396-98
(1927).
55. If anything, the formation of a partnership or merger results in a more
permanent reduction in rivalry than price fixing between independent firms. See,
e.g., Richard A. Givens, Affirmative Benefits to IndustrialMergers and Section 7
of the ClaytonAct, 36 IND. L.J. 51, 52 (1960) ("Competition is eliminated far more
completely by a close-knit combination such as a merger than by agreements
limited to specific business policies.").
56. See Meese, supra note 35, at 95-98; see also Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979) ("When two partners set the price of
their goods or services, they are literally 'price-fixing,' but they are not per se in
violation of the Sherman Act."); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85
F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898) (explaining how a partnership's reduction in price
competition is incidental to the "main purpose of a union of [the partners'] capital,
enterprise and energy to carry on a successful business, and one useful to the

community"); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263-64 (1963)
(invoking merger as example of a transaction that reduces rivalry but survives
per se condemnation); United States v. Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. 495, 507-08
(1948) (analyzing merger accomplished via purchase of assets under Section 1's
rule of reason); see also Givens, supra note 55, at 52-53 (distinguishing naked
price fixing from formation of partnership and mergers because latter
transactions can create significant benefits); cf. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 357
(stating that price fixing between partners in a partnership is "perfectly proper").
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differential propensity to eliminate price competition, explained the
disparate treatment of naked price fixing on the one hand and
mergers or the formation of a partnership on the other. 57 Judicial
assessment of the propensity of a type of restraint to produce
redeeming virtues requires the application of "economic conceptions"
that can change over time, thereby causing economists and
economically sophisticated lawyers to revise their assessment of some
restraints. 58 The NPR test did not entirely supplant the ancillary
restraints doctrine, at least in the lower courts. 59 Thus, satisfaction
of the ancillary restraints standard has remained an alternative
method of avoiding per se condemnation. 60 The possible prospect of
potential benefits plays a parallel role under the ancillary restraints
doctrine. Restraints that reduce horizontal rivalry still merit rule of
reason scrutiny if they appear capable of furthering legitimate
Failure to articulate such benefits results in a
purposes. 6 1
determination that such restraints are not ancillary and thus triggers
automatic condemnation.6 2
The second part of the NPR test and the ancillary restraints test
can potentially perform an additional function as well. If a restraint
does survive per se condemnation because it is ancillary or may
produce redeeming virtues, then the methodology of conducting rule

57. See Givens, supra note 55, at 52-53 (concluding that mergers are "far
more competition-destroying" than "loose-knit combinations," such as price-fixing
and the allocation of markets, but that mergers avoid per se condemnation
because they may produce "redeeming virtues" such as economies of scale).
58. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 55 (1911)
(approving common law decisions that had repudiated previous doctrine because
of the advent of "more accurate economic conceptions"); see also Business
Electronics v. Sharp Electronics Co., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1998) ("The term
'restraint of trade' in the statute, like the term at common law, refers not to a
particular list of agreements, but to a particular economic consequence, which
may be produced by quite different sorts of agreements in varying times and
circumstances.... The Sherman Act adopted the term 'restraint of trade' along
with its dynamic potential. It invokes the common law itself, and not merely the
static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890." (internal
citations omitted)); Meese, supranote 35, at 91-92 ("[C]ourts have felt free to rely
upon economic theories quite different from those extant in 1890, thus updating
the Sherman Act to keep pace with changing perceptions about the economic
consequence of particular agreements. While the principle animating the Rule
of Reason remains constant, applications change, as courts translate the
principle in light of new information." (internal citations omitted)).
59. See Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 406-09
(5th Cir. 1962) (holding that vertical exclusive dealing agreement was ancillary
to otherwise valid venture and thus not unlawful per se).
60. See id. at 408; see also infra note 66 and accompanying text.
61. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 280 (explaining that certain restraints that
accompanied formation and operation of partnerships facilitated such ventures
and "were to be encouraged").
62. Id. at 282-83.
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of reason analysis should, at least in principle, turn upon the type of
redeeming virtue or efficiency that a restraint might create, although
this insight is generally lost on courts and enforcement agencies. 63 By
forcing courts to assess whether restraints in a particular category
might produce redeeming virtues or efficiencies that further a
legitimate venture, both the NPR and ancillary restraints standards
create a mechanism for informing the structure of rule of reason
analysis.
For nearly two decades after NPR, the Court recognized very few
redeeming virtues when applying the per se standard. 64 The number
of restraints deemed unlawful per se expanded accordingly. 65 Group
boycotts, horizontal maximum price fixing, maximum resale price
maintenance, nonprice vertical restraints such as exclusive
territories and restrictions on customers to whom wholesalers and
dealers can resell, and tying agreements imposed by firms with any
"economic power" were "conclusively presumed unreasonable,"
These results followed
dictating automatic condemnation. 66
naturally from the state of economic theory at the time, which had
few, if any, explanations for so-called nonstandard contracts that
restricted the autonomy of dealers and other trading partners. 67

63. See Alan J. Meese, Reframing Antitrust in Light of Scientific Revolution:
Accounting for Transaction Costs in Rule of Reason Analysis, 62 HASTINGs L.J.
457, 523-27 (2010) (contending that requirements for establishing a prima facie
case should turn on the nature of the "redeeming virtues" that thwart per se
condemnation).
64. Meese, supranote 35, at 119, 125.
65. Id. at 94.
66. See Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 499 (1969)
(declaring tying contracts imposed by firms with "economic power" unlawful per
se); id. at 503 (holding that ability to impose tying agreements itself established
presumption of economic power sufficient to establish per se liability); Albrecht v.
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968) (declaring maximum resale price
maintenance unlawful per se); United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365, 382 (1967) (condemning vertical exclusive territories and restrictions on
customers to whom wholesalers and dealers can resell); Klor's, Inc. v. BroadwayHale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212-14 (1959) (declaring "group boycotts"
unlawful per se); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S.
211, 213 (1951) (declaring horizontal maximum price maintenance unlawful per
se).
67. See Meese, supra note 35, at 115-23 (describing price theory's failure to
offer beneficial explanations for nonstandard agreements and resulting hostility
to such practices); id. at 124-34 (describing judicial reliance upon price-theoretic
assumptions
agreements);

CAPITALISM
contracts).

and resulting antitrust doctrine hostile to non-standard
see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF

23-25 (1985)

(distinguishing "standard" from "non-standard"
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However, restraints properly deemed ancillary continued to escape
per se condemnation in the lower courts. 68
Perhaps because so many restraints were unlawful per se, the
Court had little occasion to elaborate upon the methodology for
conducting rule of reason analysis. When the Court did elaborate, it
articulated a fact-bound standard. 69 Indeed, some decisions invoked
the fact-intensive, standardless nature of rule of reason analysis to
bolster per se condemnation of particular restraints. 70 This left lower
courts and scholars to develop and apply rule of reason methodology.
B.

Most Salient Cases as of 1984

NCAA evaluated horizontal restraints between members of a
legitimate venture. 71 The agreements expressly reduced the output
of televised games and increased the prices members charged
networks to broadcast such contests. 72 The most relevant precedent
governing such restraints at the time was United States v. Topco
Associates, Inc. Decided in 1972, Topco assessed and condemned
restraints that were apparently ancillary to a legitimate venture,
holding that the propensity of such restraints to enhance interbrand
competition was not a redeeming virtue under the NPR standard. 73
Post-Topco decisions elaborated upon the standards governing
the scope of the per se rule. This Subpart begins with a detailed

68. See Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 939 (3rd Cir. 1970) (holding
that challenged distribution restraint was ancillary and thus avoided per se
condemnation); id. at 936 (citing Addyston Pipe among others for the proposition
that the challenged restraint "must be tested not by a per se rule but by the
standard of reasonableness"); United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F.
Supp. 153, 178 (S.D.N.Y 1960) (evaluating horizontal restraint under the rule of
reason); id. ("Where challenged conduct is subservient or ancillary to a
transaction which is itself legitimate, the decision is not determined by a per se
rule. The doctrine of ancillary restraints is to be applied.").
69. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) ("[T]he
factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a
restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint
on competition."); Arnold Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 381-82 (affirming as not clearly
erroneous district court's fact-intensive determination that consignment
agreements granting wholesalers exclusive territories were not unreasonable);
United States v. Columbia Steel, 334 U.S. 495, 527-33 (1948) (holding that
merger between rivals was not unreasonable under Section 1 after fact-bound
analysis).
70. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (contending
that per se condemnation "avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and
prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry
involved ... to determine whether a particular restraint has been
unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken").
71. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 86 (1984).
72. See id. at 91-94 (describing the restraints at issue in the case).
73. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 612 (1972).
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explication of the Topco venture and the Court's treatment of the
restraints involved. The Subpart then examines post- Topco decisions
that reaffirmed the opinion while further clarifying the definition of
redeeming virtues and thus the content of the per se rule. A full
appreciation of this pre-1984 caselaw will highlight the nature of the
Such
doctrinal questions that were before the NCAA Court.
appreciation will inform the subsequent assessment of the Court's
creation of a sports league exemption from the per se rule and the
methodology of rule of reason analysis that the Court endorsed.
1.

United States v. Topco Associates, Inc.

In Topco, several regional grocery chains formed a joint venture
("Topco"). 74 The defendants were "small and medium-sized" chains,
facing competition from national, regional, and local chains. 75 Each
member received an equal ownership interest in Topco and thus equal
rights to vote for directors, who were drawn from the members'
executive officers. 76 Members agreed not to resell their shares to
nonmembers, thereby excluding rival chains from access to the
venture. 77 The venture created and sold hundreds of "private label"
products to members for resale in their respective stores alongside
prominent national brands. 78 The availability of such private label
products strengthened the members' ability to compete with
vertically integrated national chains, each of which was marketing its
own internally-created private label brands. 79 Of course, Section 1
did not reach such single firm conduct, which did not constitute
"concerted action" between two or more independent actors. 80 As a
result, the vertically integrated national chains were free to confine
distribution of their private label items as they saw fit.
The United States did not challenge the underlying venture,
Instead, the
conceding that it was potentially beneficial. 81
government challenged additional provisions effectively granting
each member the exclusive right to distribute the private label
product in its own territory. 82 The government claimed that these
provisions functioned as naked horizontal restraints and were thus

74. Id. at 598.
75. Id.
76. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1033-34 (1970),
rev'd, 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
77. Id. at 1034 (explaining how "[t]he Topco by-laws ... prevent Topco stock
from falling into the hands of non-members").
78. Id. at 1033.
79. Id. at 1038.
80. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68 (1984).
81. Topco, 319 F. Supp. at 1040.
82. Id. at 1038-39.
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unlawful per se. 83 The district court rejected the government's
argument, holding that the challenged restraints were "ancillary and
subordinate to the fulfillment of the legitimate, procompetitive
purpose of the Topco cooperative," because they could enhance
interbrand competition; that is, rivalry between Topco members and
national chains. 84
Because the court rejected per se condemnation, it proceeded to
assess the overall impact of the restraints. The district court found
that members would not have entered the venture absent territorial
exclusivity. 85 Members' executives uniformly opined that members
operating in the same territory would free ride on each other's efforts
to promote the private label products, thereby resulting in suboptimal
promotional expenditures. 86 Lack of adequate promotion, in turn,
would undermine the collective effort to compete with national chains
armed with their own private label products and the proper incentives
to promote them. 87 The court also found that, taken together,
defendants' share of the national retail grocery market was less than
six percent, with members' regional shares ranging between one and
sixteen percent. 88 While the court conceded that the restraint might
somewhat reduce intrabrand competition, it concluded that the
procompetitive impact on interbrand competition far outweighed any
such harm, holding that the restraint was reasonable and thus lawful
under Section 1.89
The United States appealed. The government did not contest the
district court's factual findings but claimed they were irrelevant
83.

Id. at 1040-41 (recounting government's argument that the restraint

was unlawful per se).
84. Id. at 1040-43 (rejecting government's contention that challenged
restraints were unlawful per se); id. at 1038 (finding that restraints "are ancillary
and subordinate to the fulfillment of the legitimate, procompetitive purpose of
the Topco cooperative, reasonable and in the public interest").
85. Id. at 1042 ("Every executive of a Topco member who was a witness
stated categorically that his chain would not be interested in devoting the time,
energy and money to the necessary promotion and would not be interested in
Topco membership if one or more of his chain's competitors in the area also
offered consumers the same brands and products. All of defendant's witnesses
asserted that monopoly of Topco private label products was as essential to Topco
members as the monopoly of A & P, National Tea, Jewel and other national
chains' private label products was to these chains."); see also id. at 1040 ("The
government concedes that if Topco, rather than being a buying organization for
smaller local and regional chains, were a single, large national chain, none of its
practices would be objectionable under the antitrust laws.").
86. Id. at 1040.
87. See id.
88. Id. at 1039.
89. Id. at 1043 ("Whatever anti-competitive effect these practices may have
on competition in the sale of Topco private label brands is far outweighed by the
increased ability of Topco members to compete both with the national chains and
other supermarkets.").
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because the restraints were unlawful per se. 90 The restraints were,
the government argued, "a classic horizontal division of markets
which [the] per se rule condemns," citing several decisions, including
Taft's Addyston Pipe 91 opinion. 92
Defending the judgment, defendants endorsed the NPR standard
and conceded that certain horizontal restraints were unlawful per
se.93 They also invoked the parallel doctrine of ancillary restraints,
contending that such agreements avoided per se condemnation. 94 The
challenged restraints, they argued, fell into this category because of
their propensity to further the legitimate purposes of the venture. 95
To bolster their argument, the defendants invoked the work of
two antitrust superstars: former Chief Justice William Howard Taft
and Robert Bork. 96 In 1966, Bork rehabilitated the distinction
between "ancillary" and other restraints that animated Addyston
Pipe. Bork deployed this framework to evaluate territorial restraints
that were then under challenge in some lower courts, restraints that
were similar to those the Court would later evaluate in Topco.97 In
particular, Bork argued that such restraints could be ancillary and
thus avoid per se condemnation because of their potential to prevent
some venture members from free riding off promotional investments
made by others. 98
90. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 603 (1972).
91. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
92. See Brief for United States at 18, United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596 (1971) (No. 70-82).
93. See Brief for Topco at 27, United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S.
596 (1971) (No. 70-82). In its brief, Topco cited the following three cases as
examples of appropriate condemnations of horizontal restraints: United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. Nat'l Lead Co., 332
U.S. 319 (1947); and Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951).
94. See Brief for Topco, supra note 93,. at 25-34 (contending that "Topco
licensing must be measured against the standard of ancillary agreements").
95. Id.
96. Id. at 26 (contending that, in Addyston Pipe, "Judge Taft, later Chief
Justice, drew the basic and still valid distinction between those naked restraints,
unaccompanied by any purpose except the suppression of competition, and
covenants which are appurtenant to a primary and legitimate business purpose");
id. at 27 (invoking "the well-established principle of ancillary restraints, as
originally articulated by Judge Taft"); id. at 22 (citing Robert H. Bork, The Rule
of Reason and the PerSe Concept: PriceFixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J.
775 (1965)); id. at 33 n.32 (invoking Bork's definition of "ancillary" restraints); id.
at 43 n.43 (using Bork for the proposition that lack of market power should
immunize an ancillary restraint from condemnation).
97. See Bork, supra note 96, at 474. See generally Robert H. Bork, Ancillary
Restraints and the Sherman Act, 15 ANTITRUST L.J. 211 (1959) [hereinafter Bork,
Ancillary Restraints].
98. See Bork, supra note 96, at 403 (defining as "ancillary" agreements that
accompany otherwise valid contractual integration and are capable of enhancing
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Put in terms familiar to the NPR framework, the defendants
contended that, whatever their impact on rivalry between venture
members, the agreements could also produce "redeeming virtues" and
thus should avoid per se condemnation. 99 The defendants invoked
several decisions, including one involving the National Football
League ("NFL"), where lower courts had employed the ancillary
restraints doctrine to reject claims by the United States that
horizontal restraints that accompanied otherwise lawful ventures
were unlawful per se.100 Invoking Taft's and Bork's definition of
ancillary, the defendants argued that the challenged restraints could
not be unlawful per se because they accompanied an otherwise
legitimate venture and potentially furthered its lawful purpose.1 01
In particular, the defendants contended that such territorial
exclusivity was necessary to induce members to make "substantial
investments" in developing private labels in each member's territory
and to encourage identification of these brands with members' own
Such activities, defendants argued, would enhance
chains.10 2
interbrand competition by ensuring that venture members could
pursue the same private label strategies as integrated chains.10 3 The

the venture's efficiency); id. at 469 ("This article has attempted to demonstrate
that 'ancillary' may be used as a term of art to denote a restraint which not only
accompanies a contract integration but which contributes to its efficiency."); id.
at 429-36.
99. See Brief for Topco, supra note 93, at 27-28 (quoting NPR test and
contending that horizontal territorial allocation that satisfied ancillary test could
not be unlawful per se); id. ("The well-established principle of ancillary restraints,
as originally articulated by Judge Taft and developed in later cases, serves to
assist courts in a threshold determination of the applicability of per se concepts.").
100. Id. at 28-30, 28 n.26 (listing lower court cases employing the ancillary
restraints doctrine).
101. See Brief for Topco, supra note 93, at 22-23 (invoking Bork's position);
id. at 22, 26 (invoking Taft's distinction between ancillary and naked restraints);
id. at 33 n.32 (quoting Bork, supra note 96, at 474 to define "ancillary"); see also
Alan J. Meese, Farewell to the Quick Look: Reconstructingthe Scope and Content
of the Rule of Reason, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 461, 486 (2000) (summarizing the
defendants' arguments); Bork, supra note 96, at 429-36 (treating territorial
restraints that accompanied joint venture between mattress manufacturers as
ancillary to larger venture between several manufacturers operating under the
same trademark because such restraints helped ensure that venture members
could recapture the benefits of their expenditures on "local sales effort"); id.
(discussing United States v. Sealy, Inc., 1964 Trade Cas. ¶ 79,258 (N.D. Ill. 1964),
rev'd, United States v. Sealy, 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Denison Mattress Factory v.
Spring Air, 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962)). Of note, Bork also discussed Sandura
Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964) and United States v. White
Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ohio, 1961), both vertical cases.
102. See Brief for Topco, supra note 93, at 22-23. See generally Meese, supra
note 101.
103. See Brief for Topco, supra note 93, at 22-23 ("[Territorial exclusivity]
permit[s] each member to undertake the development of his private labels in his
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defendants did not assert that restraints were ancillary and thus
avoided per se condemnation merely because they accompanied a
legitimate venture. 104 Instead, they asserted that restraints were
only ancillary if they could further the "successful operation of a
lawful and beneficial arrangement." 105 Nor did defendants claim that
Instead, the
ancillary restraints were automatically lawful. 106
defendants quoted Bork for the proposition that they lacked sufficient
market share to impose competitive harm, thereby defeating any
potential case under the rule of reason. 107
108
The Court declared the challenged restraints unlawful per se.
Perhaps ironically, the Court began by quoting the entire NPR
standard, thereby seemingly reaffirming that the propensity of
restraints in a category to produce redeeming virtues precluded per
se condemnation. 109 Still, the Court rejected defendants' quest for
rule of reason treatment, invoking numerous decisions, including
Addyston Pipe, for what the Court characterized as a longstanding
per se rule against every horizontal restraint on rivalry.11 0 The most
telling of such decisions, the Court said, was United States v. Sealy, 11

trading area and to build an identification of these brands with his stores. If at
some future time the value each member would give to his private labels could
be appropriated by others and thereby destroyed, the private labels would no
longer serve their important competitive purpose. The potential Topco members,

who need a private label program truly private like those of his stronger rivals,
would be unwilling to undertake the substantial investment in a cooperative
program that would not fulfill his need.").
104. See id. at 35-42 (making expensive argument that the challenged
restraint was ancillary).
105. Id.; see also id. at 31 (noting that courts should treat restraint as
"ancillary" if it is "subsidiary to a lawful beneficial arrangement and reasonably
related to its operation" (emphasis added)); id. (arguing that restraint is ancillary
if it is "reasonably related to the successful operation of a lawful and beneficial
arrangement"); id. at 22 (invoking Bork's definition of ancillary).
106. See Bork, supra note 96, at 384 ("It follows, of course, that a finding of
ancillarity does not render a restraint automatically lawful. The function of the
ancillary concept is merely to take the questioned agreement out of the per se
category and subject it to the Act's remaining tests-market share and intent.").
"Market share and intent" were, for Bork, elements of a rule of reason analysis.
Id.
107. See Brief for Topco, supra note 93, at 43 n.43 ("The aggregate market
share of the parties does not make restriction of output a realistic threat.")
(quoting Bork, supra note 96, at 474.); see also Bork, supra note 96, at 388-90
(contending that ancillary restraints entered by firms without market power
should be lawful under rule of reason).
108. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 612 (1972).
109. Id. at 607-08.
110. Id. at 608 (describing "an agreement between competitors at the same
level of the market structure to allocate territories in order to minimize
competition" as "[o]ne of the classic examples of a per se violation of [Section] 1").
111. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
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which condemned horizontal territorial restraints that accompanied
a joint venture among numerous mattress manufacturers operating

under the same trademark. 112 The Court ignored the defendant's
argument, echoed by Chief Justice Warren Burger's dissent, that
restraints, such as the ones before it and those in Sealy, were
ancillary and thus avoided per se condemnation because they might
further the legitimate purposes of the venture by enhancing
Thus, the Court deemed all horizontal
interbrand rivalry. 1 13
territorial allocations "naked restraints" and thus unlawful per se,
regardless of whether such agreements might further otherwise valid
integration. 114
The Court did not question the district court's findings that the
restraints would combat free riding, encourage effective promotion of
the private label products, and enhance interbrand competition. The
district court had erred, the Court said, by thinking "these things
[were] relevant." 115 Thus, the Court held that the propensity of
horizontal restraints to combat free riding and enhance interbrand
competition did not qualify as the sort of redeeming virtue that could
from per se
restraints
"anticompetitive"
save otherwise
condemnation. 11 6 More precisely, the Court held that the Sherman
Act was the "Magna Carta of Free Enterprise" and thus did not allow
private parties to foreclose competition in one sector of the economy
(presumably intrabrand rivalry between venture members) to
increase interbrand competition in the overall retail grocery
market. 117

Implicitly rejecting Standard Oil's focus on monopoly or the
consequences of monopoly, the Court announced that the Sherman
Act granted individual Topco members the "freedom to compete-to
assert ... whatever economic muscle [they] can muster." 118 This

112. See id. 356-57.
113. See id. at 356-57 nn.3-4, (describing defendant's argument that such
restraints were ancillary); Topco, 405 U.S. at 613-14 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)
(noting that agreements had an "unquestionably lawful principal purpose" and
were "minimal ancillary restraints that are fully reasonable in view of the
principal purpose"); see also Bork, supra 96, at 431-33 (opining that horizontal
restraints that accompanied the Sealy joint venture were ancillary and properly
subject to rule of reason analysis).
114. See Topco, 405 U.S. at 608 ("This Court has reiterated time and again
that '[h]orizontal territorial limitations . . . are naked restraints of trade with no
purpose except stifling of competition.' Such limitations are per se violations of
the Sherman Act." (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263
(1963))).
115. Id. at 605-06 ("The District Court, considering all these things relevant
to its decision, agreed with Topco .... [W]e conclude that the District Court used
an improper analysis in reaching its result.").
116. Id. at 610-11.
117. Id. at 610.
118. Id.
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"freedom" of firms to ignore agreements they entered voluntarily
superseded the value of interbrand competition, regardless of
whether such competition improved the welfare of consumers by
reducing prices, increasing output, or enhancing quality. 119 Nor did
it matter that banningthe agreements would, as a concurring Justice
recognized, reduce interbrand competition by placing Topco members
and similar small chains at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis
integrated chains when it came to creating and promoting private
Indeed, the Court ridiculed the defendants'
label brands. 120
contention that courts should ascertain the net economic effects of
such restraints, stating that such an approach would require courts
to "ramble through the wilds of economic theory," destroying the
121
relative certainty of a per se rule.
2.

Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.

Despite Topco's indiscriminate hostility toward horizontal
restraints, lower courts continued to apply the ancillary restraints
doctrine without attempting to distinguish Topco.122 Just five years
later, in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 123 the Court
apparently reiterated Topco's broad per se rule against horizontal
restraints, causing some to doubt whether the decision's rationale
would withstand scrutiny. 124 There the Court reconsidered the per se
ban announced in United States v. Arnold Schwinn125 on nonprice
vertical restraints, including exclusive territories and restrictions on

119. Id.
120. Id. at 612-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("[A]s the District Court's
findings make clear, today's decision in the Government's favor will tend to
stultify Topco members' competition with the great and larger chains. The bigs,
therefore, should find it easier to get bigger and, as a consequence, reality seems
at odds with the public interest."). See generally Steven C. Salop and David T.
Scheffman, Cost-Raising Strategies, 36 J. INDUS. EcoN. 19, 21-22 (1987)
(observing that some firms can disadvantage rivals by inducing captured agency
to adopt regulations that impose disproportionate costs on such rivals).
121. Id. at 622 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
122. See, e.g., Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 267-69 (7th Cir.
1981) (refusing to invalidate ancillary restraint without mentioning Topco);
Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 563 F.2d 1057, 1082 (2d Cir. 1977) (rejecting
per se ban on non-compete agreements); Alders v. AFA Corp. of Florida, 353 F.
Supp. 654, 658 (S.D. Fla. 1973), aff'd, 490 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1974) (rejecting claim
that horizontal covenant not to compete was unlawful per se and evaluating
restriction as an ancillary restraint); see also Nat'l Soc'y of Pro. Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-90 (1978) (endorsing doctrine of ancillary restraints as
applied to employment contracts and sales of a business as proper expositions of
Standard Oil's rule of reason).
123. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
124. See id. at 50 n.16.
125. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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customers to whom dealers and wholesalers could resell. 126 The
Sylvania Court began its analysis by noting that Schwinn had not
mentioned the NPR standard. 127 The issue before the Court, then,
was whether Schwinn's per se rule satisfied "the demanding
standards of [NPR]."128
The Court acknowledged that such agreements necessarily
reduced rivalry between a manufacturer's dealers. 129 However,
recent developments in Industrial Organization, notably Transaction
Cost Economics, revealed that such limits on rivalry were sometimes
necessary to overcome market failures that would result from reliance
upon unbridled markets to conduct economic activity.139 Echoing the
work of Bork and others who had applied these teachings, the Court
concluded that such agreements, while departing from a "purely
competitive situation," could sometimes produce redeeming
virtues.13 1 In particular, the Court opined that such restraints could
ensure that dealers capture the benefits of promotional expenditures
by preventing other dealers from free riding on such investments. 132
While such restraints reduced intrabrand competition, the Court
asserted that they could also enhance interbrand competition, which
the Court characterized as the primary concern of antitrust law. 133

126. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977).
127. Id. at 51.
128. Id. at 50; see also id. at 51 ("Schwinn announced its sweeping per se rule
without even a reference to [NPR] and with no explanation of its sudden change
in position. We turn now to consider Schwinn in light of [NPR]."); id. at 57 ("We
revert to the standard articulated in [NPR] ... for determining whether vertical
restrictions must be 'conclusively presumed to be unreasonable, and therefore
illegal ... ."' (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958))).
129. Id. at 54 ("Vertical restrictions reduce intrabrand competition by limiting
the number of sellers of a particular product competing for the business of a given
group of buyers.").
130. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 35, at 136 (explaining that Transaction Cost
Economics "came to presume that complete vertical integration is an attempt to
avoid or overcome such market failures, thus assuring the best possible allocation
of resources in an imperfect world"); Alan J. Meese, Robert Bork's ForgottenRole
in the Transaction Cost Revolution, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 953, 963-981 (2014)
(explaining how Bork's contention during the 1960s that courts should assess
intrabrand restraints under the rule of reason reflected application of
Transaction Cost Economics).
131. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54-58; see also id. at 51-52 ("The market impact of
vertical restrictions is complex because of their potential for a simultaneous
reduction of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand competition.");
id. at 54 ("These 'redeeming virtues' are implicit in every decision sustaining
vertical restraints under the rule of reason.").
132. Id. at 54-56.
133. Id. at 54 ("Vertical restrictions promote interbrand competition by
allowing the manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his
products."); id. at 52 n.19 ("Interbrand competition is the competition among the
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Thus, the Court concluded that a straightforward application of the
NPR standard required rule of reason treatment for such
restraints.1 34 The Court suggested that such an assessment would
entail "balancing" a restraint's impact upon intrabrand competition
against its "simultaneous" impact on interbrand competition.13 5
However, Topco had rejected such balancing, reasoning that the
advancement of interbrand rivalry could not override the freedom of
traders. 136
The Court rejected the administrability argument by explaining
that Topco involved a horizontal restraint, thereby both seeming to
reaffirm the decision and distinguish it from the one at hand. 137 The
Court observed that lower courts could differentiate vertical from
horizontal restrictions, treating the latter as unlawful per se under
Topco. 138 Finally, without citing Topco, the Court concluded that the
autonomy of independent businesspeople was not a value of
independent significance under the Sherman Act, expressly rejecting
arguments to the contrary by dissenting judges in the Ninth
Circuit. 139

3. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS and Arizona v. Maricopa
Medical Society
Just two years after Sylvania, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS
("BM1"),140 the Court evaluated a blanket license-a horizontal
manufacturers of the same generic product-television sets in this case-and is
the primary concern of antitrust law.").

134. Id. at 57-59 ("We revert to the standard articulated in [NPR].").
135. Id. at 57 n.27 (describing plaintiffs "contention that balancing
intrabrand and interbrand competitive effects of vertical restrictions is not a
'proper part of the judicial function,"' and observing that Schwinn itself had
engaged in such balancing when evaluating consignment agreements (quoting
Brief for Petitioners at 52, Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36
(1977) (No. 76-15)); id. at 51 (noting that such restraints had "simultaneous"
See also HERBERT
impacts on intrabrand and interbrand competition).
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAw OF COMPETITION AND ITS

PRACTICE 268 (1st ed. 1985) ("Sylvania ... require[s] a court to weigh these two
effects against each other and determine whether the net result is competitive or
anticompetitive.").
136. See supra Subpart I.B.1. and accompanying text (recounting Topco).
137. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57 n.27.
138. Id. at 58 n.28.
139. Id. at 53 n.21 (rejecting argument by Judge Browning that Sherman Act
"was intended to prohibit restrictions on the autonomy of independent
businessmen even though they have no impact on 'price, quality, and quantity of
goods and services,"' because "[c]ompetitive economies have social and political,
as well as economic, advantages, but an antitrust policy divorced from market
considerations would lack any objective benchmarks" (quoting GTE Sylvania v.
Continental T.V., Inc,, 537 F.2d 980, 1019 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc) (Browning, J.
dissenting))).
140. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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restraint imposed by a society of composers, authors, and
publishers. 141 The restraint granted purchasers the right, for a fixed
fee, to perform any of the compositions owned by members of the
society. 142 The Court conceded that the license was a form of
horizontal price fixing that was ordinarily unlawful per se. 143
Invoking the NPR standard and Sylvania reasoning, the Court
concluded that the license differed from other forms of price fixing
because it could create redeeming virtues by facilitating transactions
that would not occur if composers were left to negotiate individually
with purchasers. 144
While the Court did not expressly invoke the term "ancillary," it
did assert that the restraint "accompanie[d]the integration of sales,
monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use." 145
The Court also emphasized that the blanket license was a new
product that could not exist but for the challenged cooperation and
resulting price fixing. 146 While the Court cited Topco a few times, it
did so only in support of the general standards governing the per se
rule, without endorsing Topco's application of the NPR standard. 147
In the meantime, scholars wondered whether Topco had survived
Sylvania.14 8 The Court answered this question in the affirmative, just
two years before NCAA, in Arizona v. Maricopa Medical Society. 149
There the Court evaluated a horizontal maximum price fixing
agreement between physicians that had established a nonprofit
venture to provide medical care to insured patients. 150 The district
court had invoked Sylvania for the proposition that the rule of reason
was the preferred method of antitrust analysis, even with respect to
horizontal restraints, and rejected plaintiff's contention that the
restraints were unlawful per se. 151
Before the Supreme Court, the defendants contended that the
agreement would produce significant efficiencies by, for instance,
facilitating accurate predictions by health insurance companies
regarding future health care expenses and thus the annual liability
of such companies. 152 By reducing uncertainty in this manner, the
141. Id. at 4.
142. Id. at 4-6.
143. Id. at 8-10.
144. Id. at 20-25.
145. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 21-22.
147. See, e.g., id. at 9-10.
148. See generally, e.g., Martin B. Louis, Restraints Ancillary to Joint
Ventures and Licensing Agreements: Do Sealy and Topco Survive Sylvania and
Broadcast Music, 66 VA. L. REV. 879 (1980).
149. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
150. Id. at 335-36.
151. Id. at 336 n.2 (describing district court's rationale for rejecting per se
condemnation of the restraint).
152. Id. at 353-54.
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restraint could presumably allow the venture participants to engage
in more accurate pricing. Accepting the defendants' contentions as
true, the Court nonetheless condemned the practice as unlawful per
se, invoking Topco several times with approval. 153 The Court made
no effort to distinguish this broad proscription against horizontal
restraints from the doctrine of ancillary restraints that lower courts
had continued to apply after Topco. 154
II. A SURPRISING REJECTION OF PER SE CONDEMNATION:
THE SPORTS LEAGUE EXEMPTION

The state of the law in 1984 did not bode well for the NCAA's
efforts to defend its horizontal price and output restrictions. To be
sure, Sylvania had recently held that the rule of reason was the
presumptive mode of analysis and reaffirmed the two-part NPR test
for determining whether a particular category of restraint was
unlawful per se. 155 Sylvania had also endorsed a broader conception
of redeeming virtues, rejecting, at least in the vertical context, Topco's
holding that the autonomy of traders superseded interbrand
competition. 156 Still, Maricopa had reaffirmed Topco, signaling that
the Court still read the category of redeeming virtues narrowly in the
case of horizontal restraints. 157 Sylvania itself had limited its holding
to non-price, vertical restraints, expressly reaffirming Topco.158
Moreover, the NCAA defendants had agreed to reduce the output
and increase the price of televised football games. 159 These explicit
restraints had a "pernicious" effect on competition, thereby satisfying
the first prong of the NPR per se test that Topco and Sylvania had
reaffirmed. 160 The redeeming virtues proposed by the defendantse.g., the supposed propensity of the restraint to enhance the quality
153. Id. at 339 ("We must assume that the respondent's version of any
disputed issues of fact is correct."); id. at 343 (citing Topco twice for proposition
that judges often lack the expertise necessary to determine the probable impact
of a challenged restraint).
154. See Nat'l Soc'y of Pro. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688-89
(1978) (endorsing rule of reason treatment of covenants ancillary to the sale of a
business because such agreements could "enhanc[e] the marketability of the
business itself-and thereby provid[e] incentives to develop such an enterprise");
supra note 122 and accompanying text.
155. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-50, 57 (1977);
supra Subpart I.B.2.

156. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 53-56, 53 n.22.
157. See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 362.
158. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-58 nn.27-28.
159. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 91-95 (1984)
(detailing the NCAA's television rights plan, contrasted with a plan devised by
the plaintiffs and others that would have "allowed a more liberal number of
appearances for each institution, and would have increased the overall revenues
realized by [the defendants]").
160. See supra notes 44-49 and accompanying text.
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of NCAA football vis-a-vis competing forms of entertainment-at best
seemed indistinguishable from the purported virtue rejected in
Topco.161
Nonetheless, the defendants contended that the restraint was
"ancillary" to the larger venture because it ensured greater live
attendance and helped maintain a competitive balance between
college football teams, thus making the product more attractive to
consumers. 162 The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, perhaps giving insufficient weight to Topco and Maricopa,
quoted Bork's ancillary restraint standard, which, of course, Topco
had rejected.16 3 Applying Bork's standard, the court held that the
challenged restraints were not ancillary to the venture and declared
them unlawful per se. 164
Still, despite the clear case law, the Supreme Court took a
Writing for the Court, Justice
surprisingly different approach.
Stevens acknowledged that horizontal restraints-even those that
accompanied lawful ventures and could enhance their success-were
generally unlawful per se, citing decisions like Topco and Maricopa.165
Nonetheless, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' bid for per se
condemnation. 166 Strangely, the Court did not mention the ancillary
restraints doctrine, an odd omission, given that the defendants had
invoked the doctrine several times in their relatively short brief and
the Tenth Circuit had itself engaged such arguments in detail. 167 Nor
did the Court mention the NPR test for per se illegality or identify any

161. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 117 (describing defendants' assertion that
challenged restraints further competitive balance).
162. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1153-54 (10th
Cir. 1983) (recounting the argument that the restraints promote output by
protecting live attendance and preserving competitive balance), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85
(1984).
163. Id. at 1153 (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY
AT WAR WITH ITSELF 279 (1978), for the proposition that an ancillary restraint is
one in which "the parties must be cooperating in an economic activity other than
the elimination of rivalry, and the agreement must be capable of increasing the
effectiveness of that cooperation and no broader than necessary for that
purpose").

164. See id. at 1153-54 (finding that the restraint "d[id] not increase the
efficiencies of the integration" by increasing overall game viewership, and
rejecting the argument that the restraint was ancillary because it could further
competitive balance).
165. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99-100 nn.18-21 (citing Maricopa and Topco
three different times and Sealy twice).
166. Id. at 101.
167. Cf. id. at 117 (opining during rule of reason analysis that maintaining
competitive balance was "legitimate and important"); Brief for Petitioner at 1216, 29-30, NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (No. 83271); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 707 F.2d at 1153-54.
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redeeming virtues. 168 Instead, the Court quoted a passage from BMI
declaring conduct unlawful per se if "the practice facially appears to
be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict
competition and decrease output." 169 Moreover, the Court did not
claim that the challenged restraints were themselves necessary to
create a new product like those that survived per se condemnation in
BMI.170
Instead of identifying possible redeeming virtues that would
satisfy the NPR test or invoking BMI's "restraint itself as a new
product" exception, the Court announced what amounted to an
exception to the NPR standard. That is, the Court exempted the
challenged restraints from per se condemnation because the NCAA's
members had also entered other horizontal restraints, not at issue
before the Court, that the Court believed were necessary to make the
venture function and thrive. 171 These other restraints, the Court
implied, would themselves avoid per se condemnation and thus merit
rule of reason treatment if challenged separately. 172 As the Court put
it:
[W]e have decided that it would be inappropriate to apply a per

se rule to this case.

This decision is not based on a lack of

judicial experience with this type of arrangement, on the fact
that the NCAA is organized as a nonprofit entity, or on our
respect for the NCAA's historic role in the preservation and

encouragement of intercollegiate amateur athletics.

Rather,

what is critical is that this case involves an industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product

is to be available at all.173

Lower courts, including the Ninth Circuit in Alston, and scholars have
read this language as exempting from per se condemnation restraints
that accompany a sports league from per se condemnation no matter

168. The Court cited NPR twice, for propositions unrelated to the test for per
se illegality. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104 n.27 (quoting passage stating that the
Sherman Act is a "comprehensive charter of economic liberty"); id. at 112 n.50
(invoking NPR for proposition that a firm that sells a product without any
substitutes possesses a monopoly). Moreover, the term "redeeming" does not
appear in the majority opinion.

169. Id. at 100 (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441
U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)). It should be noted that BMI also quoted NPR for the
proposition that agreements are unlawful per se if they "lack . .. any redeeming
virtue." BMI, 441 U.S. at 8 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,
5 (1958)).
170. Cf. BMI, 441 U.S. at 21-22 (holding that challenged restraints could
themselves constitute "a different product" resulting in a "substantial lowering
of costs" such that per se condemnation was improper).
171. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100-02.
172. See id.
173. Id. at 100-01 (emphasis added).
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how harmful such restraints may otherwise appear. 174 The Alston
Court did not question this reading of NCAA, choosing instead to
approve, without explanation, the Ninth Circuit's decision to dispense
with per se condemnation without any threshold identification of
redeeming virtues. 175 In this way, the NCAA Court was able to avoid
automatic condemnation of the challenged restraints without
questioning decisions such as Topco and Maricopa, which had held
that horizontal restraints were generally unlawful per se. 176 The
Court also avoided applying the ancillary restraints doctrine. 177 BMI,
of course, had opined that restraints necessary to create a new
product would themselves be analyzed under the rule of reason. 17 8
However, NCAA cited no authority for the proposition that a restraint
could survive per se condemnation because other restraintsnot before
the Court were necessary to create a venture or help it thrive. 179

174. See In re NCAA Athletic Grant-in-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d
1239, 1256 (9th Cir. 2020), aff'd sub nom NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021);
In re NFL's Sunday Ticket Antitrust Litig., 933 F.3d 1136, 1150 n.5 (9th Cir.
2019); O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1069 (9th Cir. 2015); Law v. NCAA,
134 F.3d 1010, 1017-19 (10th Cir. 1998); Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 186 (3d
Cir. 1998); Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 325-26 (reading NCAA in this manner
and explaining that NCAA's exemption from per se condemnation would apply
even to an agreement between member schools should they "fix the price of
admission tickets or for hot dogs purchased in the stands"); Alan J. Meese,
Competition and Market Failure in the Antitrust Jurisprudence of Justice
Stevens, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 1775, 1791-92 (2006); see also SCFC ILC, Inc. v.
VISA USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 963-64 (10th Cir. 1994) (invoking this aspect of
NCAA outside the sports league context).
175. Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2157-58.
176. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99-100 nn.18-21 (invoking Maricopa, Topco, and
Sealy).
177. See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2155-58.
178. Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 20-24
(1979).
179. The Court did invoke the views of Robert Bork to the effect that some
joint action was necessary to make a sports league function. See NCAA, 468 U.S.
at 101 ("[S]ome activities can only be carried out jointly. Perhaps the leading
example is league sports. When a league of professional lacrosse teams is formed,
it would be pointless to declare their cooperation illegal on the ground that there
are no other professional lacrosse teams." (quoting BORK, supra n.163, at 278)).
However, Bork did not suggest that any restraints that accompanied such a
venture thereby avoided per se condemnation. Instead, he opined that such a
venture and restraints that "make it efficient" should be "completely lawful,"
thereby implying an assessment of whether particular restraints could enhance
the venture's output. BORK, supra n. 163, at 279. In the same way, Bork had
previously concluded that restraints that accompanied a joint venture could be
unlawful per se if they could not contribute to a venture's efficiency. See supra
notes 96-98 and accompanying text. Thus, Bork's analytical framework
contemplated that some restraints that accompanied the formation of a sports
league could be unlawful per se.
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The Court then identified the sorts of other horizontal restraints,
not before it, that were necessary to make the NCAA function and
thrive. The point of the NCAA, the Court said, was to create a sports
league and athletic competition that was attractive to potential fans
and viewers and to provide a product that competed with offerings by
other sports leagues. 180 Quoting Bork, the Court observed that some
horizontal cooperation was necessary to create such league
competition in the first place. For instance, member schools had to
agree on rules of the game, including the number of players on a team,
the size of the field, and "the extent to which physical violence is to be
encouraged or proscribed," all of which, the Court said, "restrain[ed]
the manner in which institutions compete."181
The Court then shifted focus from restraints necessary to the
very existence of the venture to a second group that helped the
venture thrive in competition with other live entertainment. The
Court noted that the venture sought to market a brand of football
associated with an academic tradition. 182 This association, the Court
said, differentiated the product in the minds of fans from other,
analogous athletic competition.183 To preserve the academic and
amateur nature of the product, the Court said, member schools had
to agree that players were bona fide students, attended class, and
were not paid salaries like professional athletes. 184 The agreement
not to pay players, of course, was an explicit horizontal agreement on
the price of inputs, analogous to an agreement between schools on
how much to pay coaches, referees, or beer vendors. 185
Without such agreements, the Court said, each member
institution would find it in its individual interest to pay players more
than the cost of attendance and water down academic
requirements. 186 Each individual school, of course, would only
internalize a fraction of the negative impact of such decisions upon
the brand of NCAA college football. 18 7 The collective result of such
individual decisions would transform bona fide college football into

&

180. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-02 (suggesting that quality of NCAA football
was comparable to that of "minor league baseball").
181. Id. at 101; see also BORK, supranote 163, at 279.
182. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-02.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 102. The Court's admonition that players "must not be paid," is
ambiguous on its face and could nominally refer to a ban on athletic scholarships,
period. However, lower courts and scholars have read this language to refer to
the payment over and above the rough cost of attendance, that is, tuition, room,
board, and other expenses of matriculation.
185. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1022-24 (10th Cir. 1998) (condemning
agreement on coach's salaries after rule of reason analysis).
186. NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2148 (2021).
187. See Alan J. Meese, Market Failure and Non-Standard Contracting:How
the Ghost of Perfect Competition Still Haunts Antitrust, 1 J. COMPETITION L.
EcoN. 21, 27-29 (2005).
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semi-professional football with less appeal to fans. 188 However, Topco
had rejected an analogous claim that a horizontal restriction was
necessary to overcome a market failure in the form of suboptimal
promotion. 189
Instead of reiterating Topco, however, the Court invoked
Sylvania for the proposition that "a restraint in a limited aspect of a
market may actually enhance market-wide competition." 190
Moreover, the Court invoked the (unsurprising) concession by the
plaintiffs-the University of Oklahoma and the University of
Georgia-that "the great majority of the NCAA's regulations enhance
competition among member institutions." 19 1 Put more technically,
the Court asserted that unbridled rivalry between member schools in
the market for players would result in a market failure, a
deterioration in the quality of the venture's product, and a reduction
in interbrand competition. 192 The contractual limits on such rivalry
thus ameliorated the failure and increased the value of the NCAA's
output. 1 93 At the same time, the Court softened any claim that this
second set of restraints was strictly necessary to the venture's
survival, stating only that without these restraints, the product was
one "which might otherwise be unavailable."194

188. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-02 ("The identification of this 'product' with
an academic tradition differentiates college football from and makes it more
popular than professional sports to which it might otherwise be comparable, such
as, for example, minor league baseball. In order to preserve the character and
quality of the 'product,' athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend
class, and the like. And the integrity of the 'product' cannot be preserved except
by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its
effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might soon be destroyed.").
189. See supra notes 93-121 and accompanying text (describing this aspect of
Topco).
190. NAA, 468 U.S. at 103 (citing Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433
U.S. 36, 51-57 (1977)).
191. Id.
192. See Meese, supra note 174, at 1792-93. But cf. Gabe Feldman, A Modest
Proposal for Taming the Antitrust Beast, 41 PEPP. L. REv. 249, 257-62 (2014)
(premising reform proposal upon repeated assertion that the rationale for such
restrictions is a social welfare justification of the sort that courts generally treat
as non-cognizable for antitrust purposes). Professor Feldman does not, however,
engage with the possibility that removal of such restrictions would result in a
market failure and deterioration in the quality of the NCAA's product. See infra
notes 352-58 and accompanying text (describing market failure rationale in
greater detail).
193. Some lower courts have characterized this language as dicta. See In re
NCAA Athletic Grant-in-aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 958 F.3d 1239, 1246 (9th Cir.
2020) (quoting O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2015)).
194. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 102 (emphasis added) ("Thus, the NCAA plays a
vital role in enabling college football to preserve its character, and as a result
enables a product to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable."). But
see Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1017 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing NCAA, 468 U.S.
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The Court's analysis assumed that the restraints not before it
were themselves concerted action and thus fully subject to Section
1.195 Each such restraint reduced or eliminated certain forms of
rivalry between erstwhile competitors and thus produced a pernicious
effect on competition within the meaning of the NPR test. 196 Still, the
Court apparently believed that such restraints would avoid per se
condemnation and thus merit rule of reason treatment, presumably
because they were capable of producing one or more redeeming
virtues. 19 7 Indeed, lower courts have, for instance, treated the
propensity of a restraint to foster competitive balance as a cognizable
antitrust benefit. 198
III. THE COURT'S FAILED SPORTS LEAGUE EXEMPTION

NCAA's analysis of the per se question reads like an effort to
achieve two distinct objectives: (1) rule of reason treatment for the
restraints actually before the Court, despite the failure to identify any
potential redeeming virtues and refusal to apply the ancillary
restraints test, and (2) preservation of those precedents, particularly
Sealy, Topco, and Maricopa, that seemed to require summary
condemnation of horizontal restraints, including those apparently
capable of producing redeeming virtues. 199 By its terms, NCAA's
exemption protected any restraint adopted by sports leagues from per
se condemnation. Restraints that found shelter in this new exemption
ranged from those that could produce no possible competitive virtues
to those that would have avoided per se condemnation anyway under

at 100-01) (opining that the horizontal restraints necessary for college basketball
to exist include rules such as those forbidding payments to athletes and those
requiring athletes to attend class).
195. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99 ("The NCAA is an association of schools which
compete against each other to attract television revenues, not to mention fans
and athletes. As the District Court found, the policies of the NCAA with respect
to television rights are ultimately controlled by the vote of member institutions."
(emphasis added)); id. at 101 (stating that "horizontal restraints on competition
are essential if the product is to be available at all"); cf. Copperweld Corp. v.
Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984) (holding that cooperation within a
single firm does not constitute concerted action subject to Section 1 of the
Sherman Act). But see BORK, supra note 163, at 280 (suggesting that cooperation
necessary to bring venture into existence should be lawful per se).
196. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 99.
197. Id. at 100.
198. See, e.g., O'Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1059 (treating maintenance of
competitive balance as a cognizable benefit but finding the challenged restraint
could not produce such a benefit); Law, 134 F.3d at 1023-24 (treating
maintenance of competitive balance as a cognizable benefit but finding that the
challenged restraint did not further that objective).
199. It should be noted that Justice Stevens had authored the Maricopa
decision two terms before.
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a proper application of the NPR standard because they could produce
redeeming virtues. 200
If consistently applied, this regime would have three important
procedural consequences for plaintiffs challenging restraints imposed
by sports leagues. First, plaintiffs would bear the initial burden of
demonstrating economic harm sufficient to establish a prima facie
case, no matter how obviously harmful the restraint might be.
Plaintiffs in rule of reason cases fail to make such a showing ninetyseven percent of the time. 20 1 Presumably, some potential plaintiffs
understanding these probabilities do not attempt such a showing in
the first place, leaving some harmful restraints unchallenged.
Moreover, establishing a prima facie case is not free, with the result
that some plaintiffs with a strong case will abjure such a challenge.
In short, the sports league exemption will likely increase the number
of "false negatives"; that is, harmful restraints that courts do not
condemn.202
Second, courts would presumably define the content of such a
prima facie showing without regard to the type of benefits a restraint
might produce, insofar as the exemption from per se condemnation
203
does not turn on the nature of any possible redeeming virtues.
Third, if the defendant does adduce evidence of cognizable benefits
after a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case, then the plaintiff would
retain the burden of proving that harms outweigh benefits or that a
less restrictive means would achieve identical benefits to the
challenged restraint. 204
This Part explains that NCAA announced a regime of per se
liability that is both underinclusive and overinclusive, banning
outright some restraints that may produce redeeming virtues while
simultaneously declining to ban others that courts should condemn.
This Part also shows how NCAA contained the seeds of its own
destruction, by invoking reasoning that would require reversal of
decisions such as Sealy, Topco, and Maricopa-decisions NCAA
struggled to save. Alston provided the Court with a rare opportunity
to correct NCAA's erroneous application of the NPR standard,
200. The rule would also shelter classic ancillary restraints adopted by such
ventures that would have survived even the broad application of the per se rule
articulated in Topco. See supra notes 122-54 and accompanying text (collecting
post-Topco decisions applying the ancillary restraints doctrine).
201. See Michael A. Carrier, The Rule of Reason: An Empirical Updatefor the
21st Century, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 827, 827-29, 837 (2009).
202. See Meese, supra note 12, at 77-79.
203. See supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text (describing how rigorous
application of the second prong of the NPR test can inform subsequent rule of
reason analysis); cf. Meese, supra note 63, at 518-20 (contending that
requirements for establishing a prima facie case should turn on nature of the
"redeeming virtues" that thwart per se condemnation).
204. See, e.g., Realcomp II, Ltd. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 635 F.3d 815, 825-26
(6th Cir. 2011) (describing these aspects of rule of reason analysis).
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including that the Court's apparent embrace of decisions, such as
Topco, Sealy, and Maricopa, confirms that Sylvania's account of
redeeming virtues applies in the horizontal context and ensures that
courts and agencies judge restraints adopted by sports leagues under
the same standards as those restraints adopted by other ventures. 2 0
However, the Alston Court declined to address any of these questions,
leaving NCAA's resolution of them in place.
The Court's Rationale for the Sports League Exemption
A.
ContradictedBasic Antitrust Principles
The Court's rationale for exempting the restraints before it from
per se condemnation contradicted basic antitrust principles, including
the NPR standard and parallel doctrine of ancillary restraints. 2 06
Courts have employed the ancillary restraints doctrine for over a
century to test the validity of agreements that accompany other
integration that is economically necessary to create a joint venture or
firm. 207 Under this doctrine, courts have condemned restraints that
accompany a joint venture if they do not appear capable of furthering
Such a finding is
legitimate objects of the venture. 208
indistinguishable from a conclusion that the restraint cannot produce
redeeming virtues under the NPR test.
Innumerable economic ventures entail cooperation between
individuals or entire firms that might otherwise engage in unbridled
competitive rivalry. For instance, two lawyers in close proximity may
engage in cutthroat competition today only to form a partnership next
month. While such a venture eliminates rivalry for a time, each
partner is generally free to leave the firm and recommence such
rivalry whenever he or she may please, absent some agreement to the
contrary. 209 While ongoing, the partnership entails various forms of
cooperation by former, but still potential, rivals. Such cooperation
extends to matters such as price setting, joint purchasing, product
positioning, and the division of labor between partners.2 10 This
205. See Meese, supra note 12 at 84 (contending that the Court should order
re-argument so as to address these issues).
206. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1977).
207. See, e.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.
1898) (Taft, J.) (articulating this doctrine and opining that challenged restraints
violated the Sherman Act, regardless of whether they set reasonable prices,
because they were not ancillary).
208. See supranotes 56-70 and accompanying text.
209. Cf. REVISED UNIF. P'sHIP ACT, § 409(b)(3) (Nat'l Conf. of Comm'rs on Unif.
State Ls. 1997) (articulating duty of a current partner to refrain from competing
with the partnership).
210. BORK, supra note 163, at 265 ("A law firm is composed of lawyers who
could compete with one another but who have instead eliminated rivalry and
integrated their activities in the interest of more effective operation. Not only
are partners and associates frequently forbidden to take legal business on their
own (Taft's example of a valid ancillary restraint), but the law firm operates on

1138

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

cooperation is every bit as necessary

to create

[Vol. 56
and sustain a

partnership as the restraints NCAA invoked as necessary to create
and sustain a sports league. 211
The formation of such a partnership is presumptively lawful,
subject only to standards governing horizontal mergers. 212 Moreover,
once lawfully formed, coordinated interaction between members of
the partnership-a single entity for Sherman Act purposes-is
immune from Section 1 scrutiny. 2 13 According to the rationale for
NCAA's sports league exception, the presumed legality of such
cooperation between parties should immunize other forms of
cooperation from per se condemnation. 2 14 But this result does not
comport with antitrust doctrine, informed by modern developments
in economic theory. Instead, the NPR standard requires courts to
assess whether such additional cooperation may promote redeeming
virtues. Moreover, the whole point of the Sherman Act's version of
the ancillary restraints doctrine is to ascertain which forms of
cooperation outside the venture may further the venture's legitimate
objects and which merely reduce rivalry for its own sake and are thus
nonancillary. 215
Both before and after NCAA, lower federal courts, scholars, and
the Federal Trade Commission fashioned and applied such a test. 216
These tribunals announced standards that would condemn restraints
that, while coinciding with the formation of a legitimate venture, had
no prospect of producing cognizable benefits. 217 Nearly ninety years
the basis of both price-fixing and market-division agreements. The partners
agree upon the fees to be charged for each member's and associate's services
(which is price fixing) and usually operate on a tacit, if not explicit, understanding
about fields of specialization and primary responsibility for particular clients
(both of which are instances of market division).").
211. Cf. Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 357 (1982)
(stating that price fixing between partners in a partnership is "perfectly proper").
212. See Broad. Music, Inc., v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23
(1979) ("Mergers among competitors eliminate competition, including price
competition, but they are not per se illegal .... ").
213. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984).
214. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 117-19 (1984).
215. See Bork, Ancillary Restraints, supra note 97, at 219 (explaining that
some restraints deemed ancillary at common law should not be deemed ancillary
for Sherman Act purposes, given the latter's focus on a restraint's "impact on
competition").
216. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 22730 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see BORK, supra note 163, at 279 (explaining that horizontal
cooperation, even if not essential, may be lawful under certain conditions); In re
Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174, 1245-49 (1979), aff'd, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir.
1981) (weighing "precompetitive effects" of a joint venture with "anticompetitive
effect[s]").
217. See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co., 792 F.2d at 224 ("To be ancillary,
and hence exempt from the per se rule, an agreement eliminating competition
must be subordinate and collateral to a separate, legitimate transaction. The
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before NCAA, then-Judge Taft described this doctrine as it applied to
the formation of a partnership.218 According to Taft, "restrictions in
the articles of partnership upon the business activity of the members,
with a view of securing their entire effort in the common enterprise"
were ancillary and "to be encouraged."2 19
Taft did not, however, state that any restraint between the
partners was presumptively reasonable. 220 Instead, he made it plain
that rule of reason analysis was only appropriate where the
proponent of the restraint identified how the agreement might
further some main purpose of the venture to which the restraint was
supposedly ancillary. 22 1 Restraints that accompanied a partnership,
for instance, were only ancillary when made "with a view of securing
ancillary restraint is subordinate and collateral in the sense that it serves to
make the main transaction more effective in accomplishing its purpose. Of
course, the restraint imposed must be related to the efficiency sought to be
achieved." (emphasis added)); Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d
185, 189 (7th Cir. 1985) ("A restraint is ancillary when it may contribute to the
success of a cooperative venture that promises greater productivity and output.");

Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 265-67 (7th Cir. 1981) (evaluating
plaintiff's claims that non-compete agreements contemporaneous with a merger
were solely designed to eliminate plaintiff as a competitor and thus not ancillary);
In re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. at 1275 (explaining that "to be legitimately
ancillary to a joint venture," agreements "must be limited to those inevitably
arising out of the dealings between partners, or necessary (and of no broader
scope than necessary) to make the joint venture work"); id. at 1277 (invalidating
agreement restricting competition between

the parties in certain markets

because it "goes beyond anything that might reasonably be required to further a
legitimate object of the joint venture" and governs "a subject outside the ambit of
the joint venture," and is "on its face, a naked agreement between horizontal
competitors"); Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Factory, 308 F.2d 403, 409
(5th Cir. 1962) (holding that exclusive territories were ancillary to
manufacturer's otherwise valid trademark licensing scheme); Bascom Launder
Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331, 335 (2d Cir. 1953).
218. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir.
1898).
219. See id.; see also Matthews v. Associated Press of N.Y., 32 N.E. 981, 983
(N.Y. 1893) ("A business partnership could provide that none of its members
should attend to any business other than that of the partnership, and that each
partner who came in must agree not to do any other business and must give up

such business as he had theretofore done. Such an agreement would not be in
restraint of trade, although its direct effect might be to restrain to some extent
the trade which had been done.").
220. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 281, 283.
221. See id. at 279-83; BORK, supra note 163, at 279 ("[T]he parties must be
cooperating in an economic activity other than the elimination of rivalry, and the
of that
agreement must be capable of increasing the effectiveness
cooperation ... ."). Bork also added that, to survive scrutiny, the agreement must
also "be no broader than the need it serves" to achieve the benefits in question.
See also id. at 266 ("By ancillary Taft meant that the agreement was subordinate
to the main transaction, the partnership, and contributed to its efficiency.").
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their entire effort in the common enterprise."222 Thus, the test
functioned in the same way as the two-part NPR test, turning, as it
did, on whether the challenged restraint could possibly produce
efficiency benefits. 223
Robert Bork, who rehabilitated Taft's test, expressly opined that
some horizontal restraints that accompanied completely valid joint
ventures or transactions would fail the ancillary restraints test
because the agreements could not conceivably produce benefits that
furthered the efficiency of the venture. 224 All such agreements
reduced rivalry between the parties to them, with the result that
summary condemnation or not turned on whether the agreements
augured to produce benefits of the sort that would justify rule of
reason scrutiny instead of per se condemnation. 225 But, summary
condemnation was available, even though some horizontal
cooperation between rivals was necessary to create and sustain the
ventures that the challenged restraints accompanied. 226 By contrast,
NCAA dispensed with any such assessment, declaring all such
restraints exempt from per se condemnation, even when the
restraints are manifestly anticompetitive and appear incapable of
furthering the legitimate purposes of the venture they accompany. 227

222. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. at 280 (emphasis added).
223. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text (explaining that outcomes
under the NPR test turned on the presence or not of possible redeeming virtues).
224. See Bork, supranote 96, at 383 (identifying as nonancillary "agreements
not to compete which are incapable of adding to the efficiency of the integration
which they seemingly accompany"); id. ("Thus, a market-division agreement
between competitors who jointly maintain a product safety testing laboratory
could not be related to the efficiency of the joint laboratory."); see also Bork,
Ancillary Restraints, supra note 97, at 219 (opining that some covenants
enforceable at common law could not produce benefits cognizable under the
Sherman Act and were thus not properly considered "ancillary" for antitrust
purposes); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J.) ("Of course, the restraint imposed must be related to
the efficiency sought to be achieved.").
225. See Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th
Cir. 1985) ("The evaluation of ancillary restraints under the Rule of Reason does
not imply that ancillary agreements are not real horizontal restraints. They are.
A covenant not to compete following employment does not operate any differently
from a horizontal market division among competitors-not at the time the
covenant has its bite anyway. The difference comes at the time people enter
beneficial arrangements.").
226. See, e.g., In re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174, 1275 (1979), aff'd, 657
F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981). For a post-NCAA example of such condemnation, see
Polygram Holding, Inc. v. F.T.C., 416 F.3d 29, 37-38 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding
that a restraint that accompanied otherwise legitimate venture could produce no
cognizable benefits and thus violated Section 1).
227. See Hovenkamp, supra note 10, at 324-26 (noting and questioning this
aspect of the decision).
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Some may question the usefulness of the analogy between
restraints ancillary to a partnership and the restraints before the
Court in NCAA. After all, cooperation within partnerships-what
effectively
scholars once called "close knit combinations"228-is
beyond Section 1 scrutiny and is instead treated as unilateral conduct
subject only to the very forgiving standard of Section 2.229 By
contrast, the restraints not at issue before the Court but invoked by
NCAA as necessary to make the venture survive and thrive
apparently entailed concerted action as courts have defined the
concept under the Sherman Act, given the continuing independent
status of the various colleges and universities that were members of
the NCAA. 230 Thus, one might say, the "necessary" restraints invoked
by NCAA were more analogous to the challenged restraints actually
before the Court than were the activities of a fully-integrated
partnership, whose unilateral actions would fall outside the purview
of Section 1. If so, perhaps the NCAA Court was right to immunize
from per se condemnation any restraint that accompanied a venture
that required other forms of potentially reasonable concerted action
(and not simply unilateral action) to function.
However, any distinction between restraints ancillary to fully
integrated entities like partnerships, on the one hand, and those
ancillary to joint ventures that constitute concerted action, on the
other hand, is illusory for two reasons. First, as Robert Bork
explained over fifty years ago, and eighteen years before NCAA, there
is no a priori categorical economic distinction between a "loose-knit
combination," i.e., a joint venture like the NCAA or Topco, and a

228. See, e.g., The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept, supra note 97, at
383 n.25 (defining distinction between "close-knit" and "loose" combinations).
229. See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775-77 (1984)
(holding that agreements between two wholly-owned subsidiaries did not
constitute a "contract, combination or conspiracy" within the meaning of Section
1); see also Alan J. Meese, IntrabrandRestraints and the Theory of the Firm, 83
N.C. L. REV. 5, 19-26 (2004) (explaining how intrafirm price fixing falls outside
the purview of Section 1, regardless of firm's market power); cf. Arizona v.
Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 357 (1982) (stating that price fixing
between partners in a partnership is "perfectly proper"); Broad. Music, Inc. v.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (citing United States v. Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898)) ("When two partners set the price of
their goods or services, they are literally 'price-fixing,' but they are not per se in
violation of the Sherman Act.").
230. See, e.g., American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183, 186-201 (2010)
(holding that conduct of separate corporation jointly owned by thirty-two NFL
teams was concerted action because the agreement joined "independent centers
of decision making"); Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792
F.2d 210, 214-15 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that price-fixing agreement ancillary
to joint venture constituted concerted action under Section 1 where venture's
board of directors were all actual or potential competitors of the venture); id.
(invoking NCAA and Topco to support this determination).
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"close-knit combination," such as a partnership or corporation. 231
Both types of entities entail voluntary horizontal cooperation with the
potential to reduce economic rivalry that might otherwise occur but
also enhance economic productivity and interbrand rivalry. The
variety of ownership structures among sports leagues helps exemplify
this point. 232 Current law's treatment of partnerships as unilateral
actors rests upon functional considerations suggesting that
continuing rule of reason scrutiny of such ongoing collaboration would
do more harm than good. 233 Still, there is no economic reason to treat
restraints that accompany a loose-knit combination any differently
from those that accompany a close-knit combination.
Second, as a formal matter, courts have repeatedly invoked the
ancillary restraints doctrine in cases where the restraints
accompanied a joint venture (loose-knit combination) between two
otherwise independent entities, as in NCAA.234 Indeed, as noted
earlier, the Tenth Circuit took such an approach in NCAA itself,
embracing Bork's definition of ancillary and rejecting defendants'
arguments that the challenged restraints were ancillary and thus not
unlawful per se. 235 In particular, the court determined that, even

231. See Bork, supra note 96, at 472 (citing R.H. Coase, The Nature of the
Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 381 (1937)) ("[A] contract integration is as much a firm as an
ownership integration."); see also Meese, supra note 130, at 963-64, 972
(explaining how Bork applied the logic of Coase's "Nature of the Firm" to contend
that contractual and complete economic integration were economically
indistinguishable means of achieving identical economic objectives).
232. See Chi. Pro. Sports Ltd. v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 600 (7th
Cir. 1996) (discussing different judicial characterizations of sports leagues for
Section 1 purposes); id. ("Sports are sufficiently diverse that it is essential to
investigate their organization and ask [whether they constitute concerted action]
one league at a time . ... ").
233. See Meese, supra note 229, at 9 ("Thus, the concept of 'unilateral conduct'
by an indivisible entity embraced by antitrust courts is in fact a social
construction-the product of an institutional framework favorable to cooperation
that occurs 'within' a business firm."); see also 7 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT

HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw ¶1476a-d (2013) (discussing considerations
supporting treatment of ongoing collaboration between partners as unilateral
conduct); id. at ¶ 1475b ("[W]e can often classify wisely only by judging which set
of substantive standards-those governing concerted or unilateral action-best
promotes competition and fair and effective antitrust administration in a
particular case or class of cases.").
234. See, e.g., SCFC ILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958, 964-68 (10th
Cir. 1994); Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 187-90 (7th
Cir. 1985) (invoking doctrine to evaluate restraints that accompanied formation
of joint venture between two otherwise independent stores that sold "goods for
furnishing and maintaining a home"); Nat'l Bancard Corp. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.,
779 F.2d 592, 599, 601, 603, 605 (11th Cir. 1986); In re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C.
1174, 1275 (1979), aff'd, 657 F.2d 971 (8th Cir. 1981).
235. See Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1153 (10th
Cir. 1983) (embracing Bork's definition); id. at 1153 (rejecting NCAA's argument
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though the challenged restraints accompanied an otherwise valid
venture, the NCAA's price and output restraints could not produce
the type of efficiencies recognized by antitrust law, with the result
that the restraints were not ancillary. 236 This holding was also
tantamount to the conclusion that the proffered benefits were not
"redeeming virtues" within the meaning of the NPR standard.

B.

NCAA's Rationale Did Not Distinguish Topco

Even if NCAA's sports league exemption made sense as a matter
of antitrust first principles, the exemption's rationale did not actually
distinguish restraints that Topco and other decisions had summarily
condemned. Instead, this rationale "proved too much," undermining
the decisions the Court purported to save. 237 Like the NCAA, the
Topco venture was itself lawful and likely procompetitive. Indeed, on
remand, the district court approved a less restrictive alternative to
the challenged restraint, leaving the venture otherwise entirely
intact, and the Supreme Court affirmed. 238
Moreover, and again like the NCAA, the Topco venture entailed
various other types of horizontal cooperation subject to Section 1 that
were necessary to create the venture and make it work. Venture
members-actual or potential rivals-created the venture, owned
equal shares of the enterprise, and elected officers of venture
members to its Board of Directors. 239

that restraints were ancillary "because the restraints promote the effectiveness
of the cooperation by protecting live attendance at games and by promoting
competitive balance, thereby improving the excitement of and the interest in both
televised and live games").
236. Id. at 1154 (rejecting claim that restraint was ancillary because it
furthered "competitive balance" because "[n]oneconomic considerations, however
worthy, cannot be used to justify restraints that adversely affect competition");
id. (citing Nat'l Soc'y of Eng'rs v. Pro. Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679, 689, 696 (1978))
("[T]he argument that the restraints are necessary to promote athletic balance
shades into the argument that competition will destroy the market. The
Sherman Act will not countenance an argument that the nature of a product or
an industry structure is such that something other than competition is
desirable."). Of course, other courts subsequently recognized that furthering
competitive balance can constitute a redeeming virtue. See supra note 198
(collecting decisions to this effect); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 117 (opining that
maintaining competitive balance is "legitimate and important"). However, these
subsequent decisions do not undermine the Tenth Circuit's more general holding
that a restraint cannot be ancillary unless the proponent of the agreement
identifies one or more possible ways that the restraint might further the
underlying venture by generating cognizable benefits.
237. See supra note 122 (identifying various approving citations of Topco).
238. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cas. P.74,485, at
*1-5 (N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd, 414 U.S. 801 (1973).
239. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 598, 602 (1972).
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The Board, in turn, appointed the venture's officers, again from
among the ranks of venture members. 2 40 These officers and board
members ran the venture, making various collective (horizontal)
determinations impacting competition between venture members. 24 1
Thus, the Topco venture necessarily determined what private
label products the venture would offer, the quality of such products,
how to brand the products, 24 2 who could join the venture and thus
purchase the products, 243 the price and output at which the venture
would sell the products to venture members, 244 and charges to support
operation of the venture. 245 The venture also bargained with
suppliers of the Topco-label products, presumably playing potential
suppliers against each other in an effort to obtain the lowest qualityadjusted price possible. 246 Such cooperation was "concerted action"
for Sherman Act purposes, just like (horizontal) concerted action
between franchisees. 247
Such cooperation was necessary to create and maintain the Topco
venture, just like the NCAA's collective determination of how many
players could take the field, how many games each team could
schedule, and how much each school could compensate players. 24 8
Absent the joint venture, such collaboration would presumptively

240. See id. at 598-99.
241. Cf. Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210,
214-15 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (analogizing challenged restraints to those challenged in
Topco and NCAA and concluding that all such restraints were concerted action
between rivals).
242. See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1032 (N.D.
Ill. 1970) (listing twenty-nine different brands that the venture assigned to
various products).
243. Topco, 405 U.S. at 602.
244. Topco, 319 F. Supp. at 1032 ("Topco's procurement operations are
complex and extensive, involving the development of quality specifications and
standards, product testing, innovation and quality control, label design and
modernization, arrangements for label production and packaging, location of and
negotiation with sources of supply, and product distribution.").
245. Id. at 1033 ("Members pay for merchandise procured at 'average cost'
upon the same terms and discounts received from suppliers. The operating
expenses of Topco are covered by annual service charges paid by the members
and based on their gross sales.").
246. Id. at 1032 ("Topco ... procures and distributes more than 1000 different
food and related non-food items exclusively to its member chains, most of which
are distributed under brand names owned by Topco.").
247. See Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210,
214-15 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Meese, supra note 229, at 69 ("[F]ranchisees are actual
or potential competitors both before and after they sign the franchise
contract .... [F]ranchising contracts that control which products to offer, what
price to charge, and where to locate are readily characterized as horizontal
restraints."); id. at 69 n.313 (collecting additional authorities).
248. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984)
(describing these restraints).
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violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act.249 Like the various agreements
between members of the NCAA, these forms of cooperation were
presumptively reasonable efforts to maximize the venture's chance of
success and thus improve interbrand competition. Thus, NCAA's
rationale for rejecting per se condemnation of price and output
restraints applied with equal force to the Topco restraint, with the
result that the Court's effort to distinguish Topco and similar
Consistent application of the NCAA
decisions simply failed.
exemption would thus require rule of reason treatment for the
restraints challenged in Topco, Sealy, and Maricopa, for instance.
C.

NCAA Sowed the Seeds of Its Own Destruction

There is, however, a more fundamental shortcoming of the
Court's effort to exempt the NCAA restraints from per se
condemnation. In short, the rationale for the exemption undermines
the broad per se rule against horizontal restraints the Court endorsed
and thus suggests that the Court articulated and reaffirmed a regime
that was to that extent overinclusive. The Court's novel exemption
rested upon the critical assumption that the restraints not before the
0
Court would themselves survive per se condemnation. 25
The Court invoked three sources and associated lines of
reasoning for this assertion. First, the Court invoked Robert Bork's
assertion that certain activities and ventures, particularly sports
leagues, can only be carried on jointly via cooperation between firms
or other entities that are ostensible rivals. 25 1 In language not quoted
by the Court, Bork elaborated by contending that the formation of a
league should be exempt from antimerger strictures, presumably
because no individual member could produce the league's productathletic competition-unilaterally. 25 2 As a result, a "merger" between
such members could not reduce actual or even potential
competition. 25 3 He also contended that necessary restraints-the
promulgation of rules of the game and the like-should be lawful per

249. See Nat'l Macaroni Mfrs. Ass'n v. Fed Trade Comm'n, 345 F.2d 421, 42223 (7th Cir. 1965) (upholding FTC order invalidating concerted action to "fix or
establish the kinds or proportions of ingredients to be used in producing macaroni
and related products, or take any other concerted action, for the purpose of fixing
or manipulating the price of such ingredients").
250. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
251. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-02 (citing BORK, supra note 163, at 278).
252. BORK, supranote 163, at 279; cf. Chi. Pro. Sports Ltd. v. Nat. Basketball
Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 598-99 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[A] league with one team would be
like one hand clapping[.]").
253. Cf. United States v. Citizens & S. Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 121-22 (1975)
(finding that merger between firms that could not compete with one another
because of state regulation did not "substantially lessen competition" within
meaning of the Clayton Act).
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se.2 54 Second, the Court invoked BMI for the proposition that "a joint
selling arrangement may be so efficient that it will increase sellers'
aggregate output and thus be procompetitive." 255 Finally, the Court
invoked Sylvania for the proposition that "a restraint in a limited
aspect of a market may actually enhance marketwide competition." 256
Taken together, invocation of these three sources implied that
some restraints, like those setting rules of the game or requiring
players to be enrolled students, were lawful per se, as Bork had
suggested, because they were necessary to create and maintain the
product-college football-and thus did not reduce competition that
could otherwise exist. 2 57 Such logic could support recent holdings that
certain NCAA Bylaws governing player eligibility are lawful per se
under Section 1.258
Other restraints, including limits on salaries paid to studentathletes, were not obviously necessary to create the venture in the
first place and thus did appear to reduce rivalry compared to a world
Still, Sylvania's account of redeeming
without such restraints.
virtues, based upon then-recent developments in economic theory,
suggested that agreements regarding player compensation were
properly analyzed under the rule of reason because they could
overcome the market failure and reduction in economic welfare that
would result from reliance on an unbridled market for players. 259
These restraints could thus increase consumer choice, the Court said,
by facilitating the creation of a differentiated product in the
marketplace and enhancing interbrand competition. 26 0
254. See BORK, supranote 163, at 279.
255. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103 (citing Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad.
Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 18-23 (1979)).
256. Id. (citing Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51-57
(1977)).
257. See BORK, supra note 163, at 278-79 (contending that initial formation
of a lacrosse league should not be considered a merger between rivals); id. at 279
(contending that restraints that accompany a league that otherwise could not
exist should be lawful per se if they help "make [the venture] efficient").
258. See, e.g., Deppe v. NCAA, 893 F.3d 498, 501-02 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting
NCAA decision in holding that restraints "clearly meant to help maintain the
'revered tradition of amateurism in college sports' or the 'preservation of the
student-athlete in higher education"' are lawful per se); Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d
328, 342-43 (7th Cir. 2012) (same). But see NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141,
2156-57 (2021) (rejecting the NCAA's argument that such restrictions are lawful
per se); Meese, supra note 12, at 86-89 (contending that Alston should reject the
NCAA's bid for per se legality).
259. See supra notes 155-156, 190, 203, 255-256 and accompanying text.
260. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 102 ("Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in
enabling college football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a
product to be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable. In performing
this role, its actions widen consumer choice-not only the choices available to
sports fans but those available to athletes-and hence can be viewed as
procompetitive."); see also Meese, supra note 187, at 28-29 (concluding that
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The Court's assertion that restraints limiting unbridled rivalry
for players should avoid per se condemnation because they might
produce redeeming virtues has certainly proved controversial. Some
have even claimed that such restraints are indistinguishable from a
naked cartel and that the amateurism that the NCAA seeks to
preserve and promote is in fact a social welfare justification that is
simply not cognizable as the sort of redeeming virtue that saves a
class of restraint from per se condemnation. 26 1 However, this author
at least finds the Court's evaluation of such restraints convincing as
a matter of antitrust first principles. 26 2 "Cooperation is the basis of
productivity," and horizontal cooperation is no exception.2 63 Such
cooperation is often necessary to eliminate market failures that
unbridled rivalry would otherwise produce, with the result that
For
horizontal restraints often produce redeeming virtues. 26 4
instance, an agreement between schools that all players be actual
enrolled students is horizontal and would ordinarily be unlawful per
se, like any other agreement between rivals regarding which inputs
to employ. 26 5 Still, the NCAA's ban on fielding nonstudents survives
per se condemnation, presumably because allowing schools unbridled
choice of players could result in a race to the bottom, teams full of
26 6
As
nonstudent ringers, and deterioration of the NCAA's brand.
various lower courts have also recognized-including the Ninth
Circuit in Alston-closely analogous limits on compensation rivalry
for the service of players can overcome such a market failure by
preventing a race to the bottom that would otherwise occur if schools
NCAA's rejection of per se condemnation depended upon a "recognition that some
horizontal restrictions on rivalry can overcome market failures and thus enhance
the results of overall competition").
261. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Wenche Wang, The NCAA Cartel andAntitrust
Policy, 52 REV. INDUS. ORG. 351, 352 (2017); Feldman, supra note 192, at 249-50
(contending that the NCAA's concept of amateurism is a social welfare
justification and thus not cognizable under the Sherman Act). Indeed, in its
argument before the Alston Court, plaintiffs' counsel referred to the NCAA's
restrictions on payments exceeding the cost of attendance as "naked horizontal
monopsony restraints" that "would be per se unlawful in any other context." See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 42, NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141 (2021) (No.
20-520).
262. See Meese, supra note 174, at 1791-93; Meese, supra note 229 at 70-72
(explaining how horizontal intrabrand restraints can overcome market failures
and enhance the allocation of resources).
263. See Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188 (1985)
("Cooperation is the basis of productivity. It is necessary for people to cooperate
in some respects before they may compete in others, and cooperation facilitates
efficient production.").
264. See Meese, supra note 229, at 70-72; Meese, supra note 35, at 137-38.
See also Newman, supra note 52, at 522-23 (explaining how many redeeming
virtues constitute elimination of market failures).
265. See Meese, supranote 12, at 85-86.
266. Id.
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were left with complete autonomy to bid for player services. 267 The
Sylvania Court, of course, recognized that restraints on a "purely
competitive situation" could nonetheless be reasonable because they
enhanced interbrand competition. 26 8
While convincing, such analysis was irrelevant under thencurrent law governing horizontal restraints. The Topco defendants,
for instance, had argued forcefully that the challenged restraints
were necessary to prevent venture members from free riding on each
other's promotional efforts. 26 9 They also argued that such promotion
would facilitate interbrand competition against large, integrated
chains. 270 Thus, these (horizontal) restraints were every bit as
necessary to further the Topco venture as were the (horizontal)
restraints on schools' competitive bidding for players. However, the
Topco Court had rejected defendants' contention that promoting
interbrand competition was a redeeming virtue. 271 Sylvania and
Maricopa, of course, had reaffirmed Topco. 272
In short, NCAA's rationale for rejecting per se condemnation of
the restraints before it depended in part upon extension of Sylvania's
definition of redeeming virtues to the horizontal context, despite
Sylvania's (and Maricopa's) protestation to the contrary. To be more
precise, NCAA recognized that the propensity of a restraint to
overcome free riding and thus enhance interbrand competition
constituted a "redeeming virtue" within the NPR rubric, even if the
challenged restraint was horizontal. 273 In so doing, the Court
implicitly rejected any role for noneconomic considerations in the
application of the per se test, just as Sylvania had done. 274 The Court

267. See Alston v. NCAA, 958 F.3d 1239, 1257-59 (9th Cir. 2020); O'Bannon
v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1072-74 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that limits on studentathlete compensation can enhance consumer demand by maintaining amateur
nature of college athletics); Meese, supra note 174, at 1791-93.
268. See Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977).
269. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text.
270. Put another way, the Topco defendants argued (to quote NCAA) that "a
restraint in a limited aspect of the market [intrabrand competition between
Topco members]" would "enhance marketwide competition [between Topco
members and national chains]." See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
468 U.S. 85, 103 (1984) (citing Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51-57). The chains, of
course, were free unilaterally to create private label products and restrict the
number of stores entitled to sell them.
271. See supra note 115-17 and accompanying text.
272. See generally Arizona v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982);
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57-58 nn.27-28.
273. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100-01.
274. See also Nat'l Soc'y of Pro. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 690
(1978) ("Under either branch of the test [per se analysis or rule of reason], the
inquiry is confined to a consideration of the impact on competitive conditions.");
id. at 690 n.16 ("Throughout the [Standard Oil] opinion, the emphasis is upon
economic conceptions."); id. at 691 n.17 (discussing Sylvania and concluding that
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also embraced then-recent developments in economic theory,
concluding that nonstandard contracts are forms of voluntary
integration that often overcome market failures and thus enhance
economic welfare. 275
This extension of Sylvania's rationale to the horizontal context,
in turn, undermined the logic of Topco and Maricopa, implicitly
contracting the scope of the per se rule against horizontal restraints
that both decisions had applied. Roughly speaking, the Court's
rationale for exempting the challenged restraints from per se
condemnation seemed to require restoration of the distinction
between ancillary and naked restraints that a dissenting Chief
Justice Burger and the Topco defendants had invoked. 276 The Court
has never formally overruled this aspect of Topco and indeed
subsequently cited the decision with approval. 277 Some have thus
continued to treat Topco as good law. 2 78 Still, a couple of lower courts
have read NCAA as overruling Topco sub silentio, perhaps contrary
to the Court's own admonition that lower courts refrain from
anticipating the Court's rejection of its own precedents. 279 In light of

"'[c]ompetitive impact' and 'economic analysis' were emphasized throughout the
opinion."); Meese, supranote 174, at 1789 ("ProfessionalEngineersreiterated and
solidified Sylvania's rejection of the use of noneconomic values to give content to
the Sherman Act.").
275. See Meese, supra note 174, at 1791-93; see also, e.g., Alan J. Meese, The
Market Power Model of Contract Formation:How Outmoded Economic Theory
Still Distorts Antitrust Doctrine, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1293 (2013);
Benjamin Klein, Transaction Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual
Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 356, 356-62 (1980).
276. See supranotes 42-58, 113 and accompanying text.
277. See Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990) (per curiam)
(invoking Topco for the proposition that horizontal allocations of territories are
unlawful per se, without reference to the ancillary restraints doctrine); see also
Leonard Orland, Teaching Antitrust after Chicago and Perestroika, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 239, 249, 249 n.95 (1991) (treating Palmer as reaffirming Topco in its
entirety).

278. See, e.g., In re Blue Cross Blue Shield Antitrust Litig., 308 F. Supp. 3d
1241, 1260-63 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (concluding that both Topco and Sealy are still
good law); John F. Ponsoldt, Toward the Reaffirmation of the Antitrust Rule of
Per Se Illegality as a Law of Rules for Horizontal Price Fixing and Territorial
Allocation Agreements: A Reflection on the Palmer Case in a Renewed Era of
Economic Regulation, 62 SMU L. REV. 635, 643 (2009) (treating Topco as good
law); LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED
HANDBOOK 227-30 (2000) (treating Topco as good law); see also LAWRENCE
SULLIVAN ET AL., THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 54 n.74

(2015) (citing Topco to explain that, "[i]n horizontal cases, the Court has routinely
assumed that single brand restraints were subject to the same per se rule as
multibrand horizontal restraints")
279. Compare Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d, 210,
226-30 (D.C. Cir. 1986), and Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., 776 F.2d 185, 18889 (7th Cir. 1985) (invoking NCAA in support of the ancillary restraints doctrine),
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these pronouncements, the Topco/Sealy/Maricopa regime that
NCAA purported to preserve was overinclusive by maintaining a per
se rule against all horizontal restraints, a rule that lacked normative
and economic justification.
A little reflection reveals that this aspect of NCAA weakens the
case for the sports league exemption. After all, the exemption was a
carve out from an otherwise overinclusive and outmoded per se rule
against all horizontal restraints, including those that might produce
redeeming virtues and thus qualify as "ancillary" under longstanding
precedent. By reinstating the importance of possible redeeming
virtues and rejecting noneconomic considerations, the NCAA Court
implied that applications of the per se rule would reflect economic
theory's assessment of whether a restraint might produce cognizable
economic benefits. 280 Thus, the Court, and presumably lower courts
bound by its pronouncements, would no longer apply the NPR
standard in an overinclusive manner. Any "exemption," then, would
be from a per se standard entirely receptive, as the Tenth Circuit was,
to a defendant's assertions that a restraint might produce redeeming
virtues. Proponents of such an exception would thus bear the burden
of explaining why courts would be insufficiently receptive to
defendants' assertions that a challenged restraint that satisfies the
criteria for the sports league exemption might produce redeeming
virtues. Nothing in NCAA begins to discharge this burden.

In sum, NCAA's application of antitrust's well-settled per se rule
left much to be desired. As the Court itself noted, the NCAA's
horizontal restrictions on price and output were "anticompetitive"
and thus pernicious as NPR defined this term. 281 The Court's per se
analysis identified no "redeeming virtues" that the restraint might
produce. 282 A straightforward application of the per se standard
would have required outright condemnation of the restraints without
discussion of the appropriate treatment of restraints not before the
Court.
At the same time, the Court ironically purported to retain and
reaffirm per se condemnation of other horizontal restraints that had
the potential at least to produce redeeming virtues, all the while
seeming to articulate principles that, if applied across the board,

with State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (praising the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for adhering to a dubious prior decision
because "it is this Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents").
280. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (explaining that Standard Oil
contemplated that courts would update antitrust doctrine in light of evolving
understandings of the economic impact of trade restraints).
281. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 106 (1984).
282. Id. at 113-20.
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would undermine that condemnation. 283 As shown above, the Court's
special immunity for restraints imposed by sports leaguesannounced in an effort to preserve overinclusive applications of the
NPR standard-contradicted basic antitrust principles and thus
produced a regime that was underinclusive to the extent it prevented
(and still prevents) plaintiffs from invoking the per se rule against
such restraints, no matter how apparently harmful they may be.
Alston provided the Court with an opportunity to repudiate the sports
league exemption and ensure that general Section 1 principles,
particularly the NPR standard, apply to such restraints.
Unfortunately, the Court declined the opportunity.
IV. COMPOUNDING ERROR: NCAA'S ILL-CONSIDERED
RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS

As explained above, NCAA's sports league exemption requires
plaintiffs challenging exempted restraints to invoke Section 1's factintensive rule of reason. 284 Plaintiffs can only prevail under this
standard if they demonstrate that a restraint produces net harm. 285
Plaintiffs rarely satisfy this test. A study of reported cases from 1999
to 2009 found that plaintiffs failed to establish a prima facie case of
harm in ninety-seven percent of such cases. 2 86 After learning that the
NCAA Court had rejected per se condemnation of the restraints before
it, most antitrust observers would have predicted that the challenged
restraints would survive.
Often the Court delegates rule of reason analysis to lower courts,
remanding the case after rejecting per se condemnation of a
challenged restraint. 287 However, the Court in NCAA took a different
approach, choosing to conduct such analysis itself, assisted by the
283. Id. at 100-04.
284. See supra Part III and accompanying text.
285. See Cont'l T.V., Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (citing
Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918)) ("Under this rule,
the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a
restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint
on competition."); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56 (1911); Cap.
Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993).
286. Carrier, supra note 201, at 828; see also Michael A. Carrier, The Real
Rule of Reason: Bridging the Disconnect, 1999 BYU L. REV. 1265, 1268 (finding
that plaintiffs prevailed in sixteen percent of rule of reason cases).
287. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898-99,
908 (2006) (remanding for assessment under the rule of reason after rejecting
plaintiffs bid for per se condemnation); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Actavis, Inc., 570
U.S. 136, 160 (2013) ("We therefore leave to the lower courts the structuring of
the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation."); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 717-18 (1988); Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526
U.S. 756, 781 (1999); Sylvania, 433 U.S at 59 (affirming Ninth Circuit judgment
that had reversed a verdict condemning restraint as unlawful per se and
remanding for a new trial).
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district court's factual findings. Given the paucity of Supreme Court
guidance on how to conduct such analysis, NCAA's rule of reason
methodology has loomed large in the lower courts, agencies, and with
scholars, each of whom repeatedly invokes the decision for particular
elements of rule of reason analysis. 288 Indeed, the Supreme Court
itself has invoked NCAA to inform certain aspects of rule of reason
analysis in subsequent decisions, including in Alston.289 As shown
below, this overreliance is unfortunate, as the Court's analysis was
deeply flawed in some respects. Moreover, these flaws were natural
results of the Court's refusal to apply the NPR standard and
concomitant decision to assess a plainly anticompetitive restraint
under the rule of reason. Subsequent decisions, including Alston,
have compounded this error by generalizing NCAA's approach to rule
of reason analysis and applying that methodology to restraints that
may produce redeeming virtues, including overcoming a market
failure.
The Court began its analysis by repeating the obvious: namely,
that the restraints before it "ha[d] a significant potential for

288. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 416 F.3d 29, 36
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (invoking dicta in NCAA for proposition that a naked restraint
on price or output itself establishes a prima facie case for purposes of rule of
reason analysis); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998) (invoking
NCAA for proposition that plaintiff can establish a prima facie case by
demonstrating "that a horizontal agreement to fix prices exists, that the
agreement is effective, and that the price set by such an agreement is more
favorable to the defendant than otherwise would have resulted from the
operation of market forces"); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d
Cir. 1993) (invoking NCAA in support of "abbreviated ... rule of reason
analysis"); id. at 673 (invoking NCAA for the proposition that certain restraints
themselves establish a prima facie case of harm, despite the "absence of a detailed
market analysis"); id. at 674 (invoking NCAA to require defendant to justify
agreement that was "a price fixing mechanism impeding the ordinary functioning
of the free market"); FED. TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUST., ANTITRUST GUIDELINES
FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS 10 §3.3 (2000), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/public events/joint-venture-hearings-antitrustguidelines-collaboration-among-competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf (citing NCAA
for the proposition that a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case without
establishing actual harm or market power if "the likelihood of anticompetitive
harm is evident from the nature of the agreement"); Andrew I. Gavil, Moving
Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of Reason in Practice,
85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 753-56, 764 (2012).
289. See Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 769-70 (invoking NCAA for proposition that
a "naked restraint on price and output requires some competitive justification
even in the absence of a detailed market analysis"); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind.
Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986) (same); see also NCAA v. Alston, 141
S. Ct. 2141, 2157-58, 2159 (2021).
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anticompetitive effects." 290 Under the ordinary rule of reason,
however, mere potential does not suffice to establish a prima facie
case. 291 Instead, the plaintiff must adduce evidence that the restraint
produces tangible economic harm. 292 The NCAA Court concluded that
the plaintiffs had satisfied this ordinary burden, invoking the district
court's putative finding that the restraint resulted in lower output
and higher prices than would have occurred without it.293 This
finding, it should be noted, was entirely speculative. The restraints
had been in place in one form or another since the early 1950s when
the NCAA punished the University of Pennsylvania for televising
home games. 294 There was thus no control group; that is, no
counterfactual against which to compare the prices and output that
were obtained under the challenged plan. 295
This finding, the Court said, immediately cast upon the
defendants a burden of establishing some justification for the
restraint. 296 Lower courts, the enforcement agencies, and scholars
have read the decision to authorize dispensing with the market power
inquiry, thereby allowing plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case
merely by establishing "actual detrimental effects." 297
Courts,

290. NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104 (1984)
("Because it restrains price and output, the NCAA's television plan has a
significant potential for anticompetitive effects.").
291. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d at 673 (citing Tunis Bros. v. Ford Motor Co., 952
F.2d 715, 728 (3d Cir. 1991)).
292. See Realcomp II, Ltd. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 635 F.3d 815, 827 (6th Cir.
2011); Cap. Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 543
(2d Cir. 1993); see also Law, 134 F.3d at 1020 (finding that plaintiffs establish a
prima facie case by showing that the challenged restraint reduced salaries of socalled "restricted-earnings coaches" compared to prerestraint baseline).
293. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 104-08; see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw:
AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 430-33 (1986)

(reading NCAA as resting upon finding that restraint produced actual
competitive harm and not mere existence of the restraint).
294. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 89-91 (describing the history of the NCAA's
adoption of limits on televising games).
295. See Meese, supra note 63, at 477-78, 478 n.105 (describing district
court's methodology in NCAA as a "thought experiment" and hypothetical
assessment of the impact of removal of the challenged restraints).
296. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113 (invoking both nature of the restraint and the
"findings of the District Court ... that it has operated to raise prices and reduce
output" to require shifting burden to the defendants).

297. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460
(1986) (citing NCAA to support holding that proof of actual detrimental effects
sufficed to make out a prima facie case); Law, 134 F.3d at 1020 (invoking NCAA
for proposition that plaintiff could establish a prima facie case by establishing
that restraint altered salaries of certain "restricted-earnings coaches" compared
to the status quo ante); Cap. Imaging Assocs. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996
F.2d 537, 546 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing NCAA for the proposition that plaintiffs need
not demonstrate market power to establish a prima facie case and may establish
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including the Ninth Circuit in Alston, have invoked this logic when
assessing restraints on compensation that schools pay students and
coaches. 298 The Supreme Court affirmed and approved the Ninth
Circuit's reliance on "actual detrimental effects," albeit combined
with the NCAA's stipulation that it possessed power in a relevant
market.299
At first glance, reliance upon actual detrimental effects to
establish a prima facie case makes perfect sense. Section 1's rule of
reason, as explained in Standard Oil, mandates an assessment of
whether a challenged restraint produces monopoly or the results of
monopoly, namely higher prices, reduced output, and/or reduced
quality. 00 Moreover, the proper baseline for such an assessment
would seem to be the status quo ante the restraint. Thus, it would
seem, proof that a restraint increases prices or reduces output
compared to that baseline should establish a prima facie case of harm,
thereby shifting the burden of producing evidence of benefits to
defendants. 301
But first glances are sometimes mistaken. NCAA and its progeny
(judicial, agency, and academic) made such a mistake when they
concluded that actual detrimental effects would establish a prima
facie case in all rule of reason cases. For, as explained elsewhere, the
relevance of such proof depends critically upon the nature of the
restraint before the court and, more precisely, why the restraint
survived per se condemnation under the NPR standard or ancillary
such a case by proving actual detrimental effects); see also United States v. VISA
U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 n.4 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing NCAA for the proposition
that proof of market power may not be necessary to establish a prima facie case);
FED. TRADE CoMM'M & DEP'T OF JUST., supra note 288, at 10-11 §3.3,
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/publicevents/joint-venture-he
arings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-among-competitors/ftcdojguidelines2.pdf (citing Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 460-61 for the proposition that
proof that "anticompetitive harm has resulted from an agreement already in
operation" suffices to make out a prima facie case); Andrew I. Gavil & Steven C.
Salop, Probability,Presumptionsand EvidentiaryBurdens in Antitrust Analysis:
Revitalizing the Rule of Reason for Exclusionary Conduct, 168 UNIv. PA. L. REV.
2107, 2116 (2020) (endorsing this approach).
298. See Alston v. NCAA, 958 F.3d 1239, 1256-57 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing
Alston v. NCAA, 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1070 (N.D. Cal. 2019)); Alston, 375 F.
Supp. 3d at 1070 ("The challenged rules thus have severe anticompetitive effects
and student-athlete are harmed as a result of the challenged rules, because the
rules deprive them of compensation that they would otherwise receive for their
athletic services."); O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1070-71 (9th Cir. 2015)
(resting prima facie case on proof of "an anticompetitive effect"); Law, 134 F.3d
at 1020 (finding that plaintiff established prima facie case against NCAA's
restricted earnings rule by showing that salaries of affected coaches fell shortly
after implementation of the rule).
299. See Alston, 141 S. Ct. at 2154.
300. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
301. See Gavil, supranote 288, at 754 (attributing such reasoning to NCAA).
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restraints test.3 0 2 To be even more precise, the usefulness or not of
such proof depends upon the type of redeeming virtue the court
invokes when it determines that a particular type of restraint should
survive per se condemnation.
If the possible virtues would take the form of technological
efficiencies, it makes perfect sense to treat prerestraint prices as a
baseline against which to evaluate postrestraint prices. 303 After all,
technological efficiencies should manifest themselves as reduced
production costs and thus higher output and lower prices, other
things being equal. Proof that such a restraint produces prices higher
than the prerestraint level is thus consistent with two distinct and
competing hypotheses: first, that the restraint generates market
power and no efficiencies, or second, that the restraint generates both
market power and efficiencies, but that the efficiencies are too small
to counteract the price impacts of the exercise of market power.30 4 In
either case, it makes sense to shift the burden of production to the
defendant.3 0 5
However, as Sylvania taught us, some efficiencies are not
technological. Instead, challenged restraints may also avoid per se
condemnation if they may improve the operation of a market by

302. See Meese, supranote 35, at 145-61.
303. See id. at 166-67.
304. See Alan A. Fisher et al., Afterword: Could a Merger Lead to Both a
Monopoly and a Lower Price, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1697, 1702 (1983) ("A merger
would have to produce extraordinarily large cost savings to permit the same or
lower prices from monopoly than from a premerger competitive situation.").
305. Readers may wonder whether this conclusion turns on the welfare
standard employed when assessing whether a restraint is reasonable. See Roger
D. Blair & D. Daniel Sokol, The Rule of Reason and the Goals of Antitrust: An
Economic Approach, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 471, 480 (2012) (concluding that the
Supreme Court has not clarified whether Section 1 analysis focuses on total
welfare or purchaser welfare). It does not. Under a purchaser welfare standard,
higher prices constitute an unambiguous harm. See id. (citing Leegin Creative
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 909 (2001)). Under a total
welfare approach, enhanced prices do not themselves constitute harm but instead
indicate that the restraint has resulted in an allocation of resources inferior to
that which obtained before the restraint. In either case, then, proof of higher
prices indicates that the restraint has produced antitrust harm. At the same
time, the nature of subsequent balancing will depend upon the choice of welfare
standards. Under a total welfare standard, courts would compare the extent of
the allocative loss to the magnitude of efficiencies the restraint produces. Under
a purchaser welfare standard, the court would ask whether the benefits of the
restraint offset the harm by preventing price increases above the prerestraint
baseline. See Alan J. Meese, Debunking the PurchaserWelfare Account of Section
2 of the Sherman Act: How HarvardBrought Us a Total Welfare Standard and
Why We Should Keep it, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 659, 668-70 (2010) (describing nature
of balancing under total welfare and purchaser welfare standards).
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overcoming a market failure. 306 The classic example would be the
propensity of minimum resale price maintenance

or a nonprice

vertical restraint to overcome failure in the distribution market by
combatting free riding and increasing the output of advertising and
promotion. 30 7 If successful, such a restraint and the resulting
promotion would enhance demand and thus the price for the relevant
product.3 0 8
In these circumstances, the restraint has survived per se
condemnation precisely because the prerestraint baseline price is not
necessarily the result of a well-functioning market. Proof that the
restraint resulted in prices higher than the prerestraint baseline is
equally consistent with two competing hypotheses: first, that the
restraint has created and exercised market power, or second, that the
restraint has enhanced interbrand competition and thus produced
procompetitive benefits. 30 9 Evidence that is equally consistent with
two such competing hypotheses cannot, without more, establish a
prima facie case under traditional antitrust procedure. 310 In these
circumstances, cases should only proceed if the plaintiff can establish
that the defendants possess market power of the sort necessary to
produce economic harm. 31 1
The Court's erroneous conclusion to the contrary is quite
understandable. After all, the Court's rejection of the NPR standard
in favor of the sports league exemption precluded consideration of
alternate explanations for the postrestraint price increase that the
district court identified. 3 12 The Court exempted the challenged
restraints from per se condemnation without identifying a redeeming

306. See Meese, supra note 35, at 141-44; Newman, supranote 52, at 536-37
n.272.
307. See Robert H. Bork, Resale PriceMaintenance and Consumer Welfare, 77
YALE L.J. 950, 955-56 (1968) (treating promotional information as "just as much
an output of the economy as any other product (or service)").
308. See Meese, supra note 63, at 507-08 (explaining how restraints such as
those condemned in Topco could encourage promotion and thus enhance demand
for the venture's product).

309. Meese, supra note 35, at 148-52.
310. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
587-88 (1986) (noting that evidence that is as consistent with procompetitive as
with anticompetitive objectives cannot, without more, support an inference of
anticompetitive conduct); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752,
762-64 (1984) (same); First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253,
279-80 (1968) (same); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc.,
504 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1992) ("Legal presumptions that rest on formal distinctions
rather than actual economic realities are generally disfavored in antitrust law.").
311. See Meese, supranote 35, at 148.
312. See supra notes 156-61, 191-98 and accompanying text.
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virtue that the restraints might create.3 13 Nor were there any
apparent potential benefits of the restraints. 314
The Court thus had no reason to consider the possibility that
presence of a redeeming virtue might result in higher prices, thereby
undermining the argument for resting a prima facie case on the
presence of "actual detrimental effects." Instead, the Court naturally
defaulted to the foundational price-theoretic framework that
interprets increased prices as reflecting an exercise of market
power. 315 In other contexts, by contrast, the Court has recognized
that price increases do not necessarily indicate the exercise of such
power but instead may reflect the beneficial consequences of a
restraint. 316

The restraints before the Court were simply not representative
of the sort of restraints that ordinarily merit rule of reason treatment,
i.e., that avoid per se condemnation because they may produce
redeeming virtues. However, NCAA did not qualify or limit the
application of its rule of reason methodology. Lower courts and the
enforcement agencies have unfortunately extrapolated from NCAA's
reliance upon actual detrimental effects in an unrepresentative case,
treating proof of such effects as a generalized method of establishing
a prima facie case. 317
Courts and agencies have exacerbated this error by assuming
that any benefits that such restraints produce coexist with harms,
creating an irrebuttable presumption once a plaintiff establishes a
prima facie case in this manner, thereby requiring tribunals to
balance benefits against putative harms. 318 Similar erroneous logic
informs judicial and administrative condemnation of restraints that
produce significant benefits merely because there is a less restrictive

313. See supra note 170-71 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
315. See Meese, supra note 63, at 512-19 (contending that price theory's
partial equilibrium framework results in misleading assessment of restraints
that avoid per se condemnation because they may produce nontechnological
efficiencies by overcoming a market failure).
316. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 571 U.S. 877, 895-97
(2007); Bus. Elecs. Corp., v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 728, 731 (1988); see
also Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 762-64 (1984).
317. See Neal Devins & Alan Meese, Judicial Review and Nongeneralizable
Cases, 32 FLA. ST. L. REV. 323, 338, 351 (2005) (contending that precedents
adopted in cases with idiosyncratic facts may not reflect appropriate
consideration of various factors that should inform the resulting rule); supranote
297 (collecting authorities invoking NCAA in support of actual detrimental
effects standard).
318. See Meese, supra note 35, at 164-65 (critiquing this aspect of the rule of
reason as implemented in the lower courts and contending that evidence that a
restraint overcomes a market failure should undermine any presumption that
putative actual detrimental effects reflect exercise of market power).
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means of achieving such benefits. 319 Here again, this test rests upon
the assumption that the benefits produced by the restraint coexist
with harms, an indefensible assumption after the defendant has
adduced significant evidence that the restraint produces benefits by
overcoming a market failure. 320 The Court in Alston itself committed
this error by endorsing application of the less restrictive alternative
test (for the first time) in a case where the Court did not question the
lower courts' findings that the NCAA's limits on compensation
enhanced the quality of the product-intercollegiate athletic
competition-produced and sold by the joint venture. 321 This finding
was consistent with and confirmed the defendants' contention that
the challenged restraints overcame the market failure that would
have occurred if member institutions remained free to determine
what compensation they would provide to student-athletes. 32 2 Such
proof undermined any argument that the restraint's impact on player
compensation was necessarily the result of an exercise of market
power. On the contrary, such proof merely confirmed that the
restraint produced redeeming virtues, the prospect of which should
prevent per se condemnation under both the NPR standard and the
ancillary restraints test. Absent some other indicium of antitrust
harm, there is simply no reason to assume that the challenged
restraint is "restrictive" and thus no reason to search for a less
restrictive alternative.323
319. See, e.g., Alston v. NCAA, 958 F.3d 1239, 1264 (9th Cir. 2020) (stating
that the lower court opinion noted that provisions preventing schools from paying
outright salaries to players were "anticompetitive" and yet also enhanced the
quality of the venture product); id. at 1260-62 (subjecting such restraints to a
less restrictive alternative test on assumption that benefits coexisted with
harms); FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., supranote 288, at 24 §3.36(b).
320 See Meese, supra note 63, at 480 (describing this assumption of the less
restrictive alternative test); id. ("Absent this assumption, there is simply no
reason to assume that the restraint is 'restrictive,' or to ask whether there is a
less restrictive means of achieving the same benefits."); Meese, supranote 35, at
82 ("Consideration of such alternatives depends upon an assumption that
procompetitive benefits necessarily coexist with anticompetitive effects once a
plaintiff has established a prima facie case."); id. at 169 n.501 (explaining that
application of the less restrictive alternative test depends upon an assumption
that the restraint's benefits coexist with harms); id. at 170 (contending that proof
that a less restrictive alternative will achieve same or similar benefits as
challenged restraint should not give rise to rule of reason liability if restraint
overcomes a market failure).
321. Alston, 958 F.3d at 1257; see also Thomas Nachbar, Ancillary Restraints
and the Less Restrictive Alternative Test, 45 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2022) (explaining how the Supreme Court had repeatedly declined to adopt the
less restrictive alternative test).
322. Id.
323. To be sure, the plaintiffs also established, based on the defendants'
concession, that the NCAA possessed power in a relevant market. However,
firms with market power often enter voluntary and efficient contracts with
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Endorsement of the actual detrimental effects test was not the
Court's only rule of reason misstep. After indicating that such effects
sufficed to establish a prima facie case, the Court addressed the
defendants' argument that plaintiffs must in all cases prove market
power to establish a prima facie case under the rule of reason. 324 The
Court rejected this argument, at least as applied to restraints such as
those before the Court. 325 "[A]s a matter of law," the Court said, "the
absence of proof of market power does not justify a naked restriction
on price or output."326 While the Court did not define the term
"naked," it presumably meant to refer to those restraints that set
price and/or output without any possibility of simultaneously
producing redeeming virtues. 327 While probably dicta, scholars,
courts, and the enforcement agencies subsequently read this single
sentence as establishing an entirely new brand of rule of reason
analysis-the so-called "Quick Look." 32 8 Under this approach, the
plaintiff may establish a prima facie case simply by convincing the
tribunal that a restraint is "inherently suspect" and thus poses a
threat of competitive harm sufficient to establish a prima facie
case. 329

counterparties, without exercising such power to obtain such agreement. See
Meese, supra note 275, at 1345-57 (describing process of voluntary formation of
non-standard contracts); id. at 1353-55 (explaining how firms with market power
may employ an identical process of voluntary contract formation).
324. See NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109-10
(1984).
325. Id. at 109-13.
326. Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
327. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963)
("Horizontal territorial limitations, like 'group boycotts, or concerted refusals by
traders to deal with other traders' are naked restraints of trade with no purpose
except stiflingof competition." (emphasis added) (quoting Kor's Inc v. BroadwayHale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959)). There is one alternative, however.
That is, the term "naked" could be a synonym for "express" or "explicit." Under
this approach, a "naked" restraint could avoid per se condemnation because it
might produce redeeming virtues by, for instance, overcoming a market failure.
See, e.g., Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 229
(D.C. Cir. 1986) (declining to condemn explicit horizontal price restraint that was
ancillary to legitimate joint venture).
328. See, e.g., Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756, 769-70
(1999) (detailing purported creation of the "Quick-Look" analysis in previous
cases).
329. See, e.g., Polygram Holding Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 416 F.3d 29, 3536 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993)
(invoking NCAA in support of "abbreviated rule of reason analysis"); id. at 673
(invoking NCAA for the proposition that certain restraints themselves establish
a prima facie case of harm, despite the "absence of a detailed market analysis");
id. at 674 (invoking NCAA to require defendant to justify agreement that was "a
price fixing mechanism impeding the ordinary functioning of the free market").
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The rejection of a market power filter for truly naked restraints
made perfect sense as a matter of antitrust principles. After all, both
before and after NCAA, a restraint that set price and output without
any possibility of producing redeeming virtues was unlawful per se,
without regard to the market position of the parties or any proof that
the restraint produced harm.33 0 Such summary condemnation, of
course, necessarily obviated the need for rule of reason analysis of any
sort, let alone analysis of market power.
Of course, NCAA did not summarily condemn the restraints
before it but instead assessed them under the rule of reason. 331 But
assuming that the restraints were truly naked, requiring plaintiffs to
prove market power to establish a prima facie case against restraints
the Court should have condemned outright would have wasted
resources and deterred some plaintiffs from challenging such
agreements in the first place. Such a requirement would have
effectively immunized some unambiguously harmful restraints from
challenge, thereby increasing the number of false negatives without
any apparent countervailing benefit. 332
Thus, the Court's rejection of the market power filter
presumably did no harm in NCAA itself. Nor would it do any harm
in other cases where courts improperly exempt restraints that cannot
produce redeeming virtues from per se condemnation. 333 However,
this rejection and its rationale did not remain confined to NCAA or
other cases where possible redeeming virtues were absent. Instead,
lower courts, enforcement agencies, and scholars have read the
decision to authorize dispensing with the market power inquiry in
any number of rule of reason cases. 334
Indeed, and perhaps more tellingly, these courts have also read
NCAA as holding that the mere existence of certain restraints suffices
to establish a prima facie case, thereby dispensing with the need to
offer any evidence of antitrust harm-whether market power or
actual detrimental effects-to establish a prima facie case. 335
Moreover, no judicial or agency articulation of this approach limits its
application to cases where defendants have somehow avoided per se

330. Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Super. Ct. Trial Laws., 493 U.S. 411, 424 (1990)
(rejecting reasonable price defense for price-fixing agreement between public
defenders); Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 647 (1980) (per
curiam).
331. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 119.
332. See supra note 202 and accompanying text (explaining how NCAA's
sports league exemption predictably generates false negatives).
333. See, e.g., Polygram, 416 F.3d at 33-39 (subjecting challenged restraint to
"Quick Look" analysis without identifying rationale for declining to condemn
restraint as unlawful per se).
334. See supra note 297 and accompanying text (collecting cases addressing
this topic).
335. Meese, supra note 35, at 99-100.
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condemnation without identifying any possible redeeming virtue.
Thus, the Supreme Court, lower courts, enforcement agencies, and
scholars have all recognized the possibility that restraints that
survive per se condemnation because they may produce redeeming
virtues may nonetheless pose such a risk of net anticompetitive harm
that they are "inherently suspect" and thus suffice to establish a
prima facie case. 336 Indeed, under current law, consideration of
whether a restraint is inherently suspect is very often the first step
of what was once ordinary rule of reason analysis. 337
At the same time, the answer to this question is almost always
"no," at least in the judicial arena. That is, courts almost always

&

336. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Actavis, Inc., 570 U.S. 136, 159-60 (2013)
(considering but rejecting application of "Quick Look" doctrine to restraint that
survived per se condemnation because it might produce benefits); FED. TRADE
CoMM'N & DEP'T OF JUST., supra note 288, at 8-9 §3.2 (articulating standards
governing whether restraint is ancillary to otherwise valid venture and thus
avoids per se condemnation); id. at 10-11 §3.3 (asserting that the agencies will
condemn an agreement "without a detailed market analysis" "where the
likelihood of anticompetitive harm is evident from the nature of the
agreement ... absent overriding benefits that could offset the anticompetitive
harm").
337. See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7 n.3 (2006) (rejecting
plaintiff's argument that restraint was properly subject to a "Quick Look"
analysis); Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756, 769-81 (1999)
(rejecting contention that challenged restraint was inherently suspect and
therefore subject to "Quick Look" analysis); Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d
1118, 1137-39 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (rejecting plaintiff's argument that
restraint was properly subject to "Quick Look"); Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP
Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 829-32 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming district court's refusal
to instruct the jury on plaintiff's "Quick Look" theory); Major League Baseball
Props. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 317-34 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting plaintiff's
contention that challenged restraints were properly subject to "Quick Look");
Gordon v. Lewistown Hosp., 423 F.3d 184, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2005) (declining to
subject exclusive dealing arrangement to "Quick Look"); Worldwide Basketball
Sports Tours v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959-62 (6th Cir. 2004) (rejecting plaintiffs
claim that challenged restraint was subject to "Quick Look" analysis); Cont'l Air
Lines, Inc. v. United Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 509-14 (4th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting lower court's determination that challenged restraint was subject to
"Quick Look"); Chi. Pro. Sports, Ltd. v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 95 F.3d 593, 601
(7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting preliminary determination that "Quick Look" applied
and instead holding that proof of market power was necessary to establish a
prima facie case); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1367 n.9 (3d
Cir. 1996) (declining to subject exclusive dealing arrangement to "Quick Look"
analysis); U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 594 (1st Cir.
1993) (declining to utilize "Quick Look" analysis); Metro. Intercollegiate
Basketball Ass'n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (rejecting
plaintiffs contention that sports league restraint should be subject to a "Quick
Look"); Holmes Prods. Corp. v. Dana Lighting, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 27, 33 (D. Mass.
1997) (declining to subject exclusive distribution agreement to "Quick Look"
analysis).
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reject a plaintiff's contentions that a restraint that has avoided per se
condemnation because it may produce redeeming virtues is
nonetheless inherently suspect. 338 The only exceptions seem to be for
those rare cases in which courts exempt a restraint from per se
condemnation without identifying any potential redeeming virtues,
as occurred in NCAA itself. 339 As a result, investments by plaintiffs,
defendants, and courts in determining whether a restraint is
inherently suspect are a waste of society's resources, insofar as this
inquiry always leads to the result that would have occurred even
absent such an inquiry-ordinary rule of reason analysis. 340 To the
extent NCAA gave rise to the "Quick Look," the decision is responsible
for this waste.
Despite these repeated judicial rebuffs, scholars in particular
have continued their efforts to identify a category of restraints that
avoid per se condemnation but nonetheless pose such anticompetitive
harm that they are "inherently suspect." These efforts generally
begin with a citation of NCAA as the beginning of the so-called "Quick
Look,"341 a citation that thereby confers a modicum of legitimacy on
the category and encourages the devotion of scholarly and judicial
energy to the development of some defensible definition of "inherently
suspect." 342 At the same time, neither scholars nor jurists have
generated a tractable standard for distinguishing "inherently
suspect" restraints from those that should receive ordinary rule of
reason treatment. 343 This should be no surprise. Restraints generally
avoid per se condemnation because they accompany some admittedly
legitimate venture or transaction and, in addition, may further the
legitimate, efficiency-enhancing objects of the venture. Moreover,
many such agreements are horizontal and may even entail horizontal
allocations of territories or price setting. 344 Treating all such
agreements as "inherently suspect," and thus sufficient to establish a

338. See, e.g., Meese, supranote 2, at 871 (explaining that "defendants almost
always prevail at step one" of the "Quick Look" analysis).
339. See, e.g., Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 416 F.3d 29, 37
(2005); United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993) (declining to
condemn challenged horizontal price fixing without identifying a possible
redeeming virtue that the restraint might produce).
340. See Meese, supra note 2, at 871.
341. See Gavil, supra note 288, at 755-56 (stating that NCAA endorsed the
"truncated" rule of reason).
342. See, e.g., Gavil & Salop, supranote 297, at 2121 (endorsing "truncated"
rule of reason whereby the presence of an inherently suspect restraint suffices to
establish a prima facie case).
343. See Meese, supra note 2, at 877-80 (explaining that scholars and courts
have failed to identify a tractable standard for identifying which restraints are
inherently suspect).
344. See also Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 189 (7th
Cir. 1985) (explaining that restraints deemed ancillary are just as horizontal as
horizontal restraints deemed unlawful per se).
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prima facie case, would unnecessarily increase the cost of rule of
reason litigation, predictably generate numerous false positives, and
thus condemn various wealth-creating restraints. 345
Here again one can trace the Court's erroneous suggestion to its
departure from the traditional two-part framework for determining
whether a category of restraint is unlawful per se. Adherence to this
framework would have required the Court first to determine whether
the restraints before it may produce redeeming virtues. A negative
answer would have required the Court to condemn summarily the
restraints before it, thereby obviating the need for any discussion of
By adopting such an
how to conduct rule of reason analysis.
approach, the Court would have avoided the need to opine on the
methodology of rule of reason analysis while still assessing a restraint
that by its nature was anticompetitive on its face and could produce
no redeeming virtues. Unfortunately, the Court instead took an
approach that led it to opine about the standards for establishing a
prima face case based upon a restraint and record that was not
representative

of those

restraints that properly

survive per se

condemnation. 34 6 The result has been more than three decades of
doctrinal evolution and scholarly dialogue premised upon an
idiosyncratic and misleading application of the rule of reason.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Alston provided the Court with an opportunity to correct NCAA's
own errors as well as some of those the decision inspired. The Court
could have discarded the sports league exemption and reinstated the
NPR standard and ancillary restraints test as the proper
methodology for assessing whether such restraints merit rule of
The Court could have further clarified that
reason treatment.
Sylvania's approach to defining redeeming virtues applies in the
horizontal context, thereby confirming that Topco and similar
decisions are no longer good law. 347 The result would have been a per
se rule that is neither underinclusive nor overinclusive but instead
empowers courts to condemn those restraints-and only those
restraints-that reduce rivalry without any prospect of producing
efficiencies.

345. See Gavil & Salop, supra note 297, at 2139 (opining that the mere fact
that a restraint is horizontal "does not automatically justify an anticompetitive
presumption"); Meese, supra note 2, at 878-79 (same).
346. See Devins & Meese, supranote 317, at 336, 351 (contending that judicial
decisions based on nongeneralizable facts generate distorted doctrine).
347. To its credit, the Court unanimously confirmed that the Sherman Act
bans only those restraints that reduce consumer welfare, thereby undermining

to that extent Topco's holding that the autonomy of traders from contracts they
voluntarily entered supersedes interbrand competition and thus consumer
welfare. See NCAA v. Alston, 141 S. Ct. 2141, 2151-52 (2021).
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None of the parties asked the Court to rethink NCAA's sports
league exemption or the erroneous approaches to rule of reason
analysis that it inspired. 348 At the same time, there was Sherman Act
precedent for speaking more broadly than absolutely necessary to
resolve a particular case.
Sylvania itself exemplified such an
approach. 349 There the Ninth Circuit had reversed the district court's
determination that a location clause was unlawful per se,
distinguishing the practice from the exclusive territory the Court had
summarily condemned in Schwinn.350 The defendants contended that
the Court could affirm the Ninth Circuit's decision without overruling
Schwinn, a result that Justice White advocated in his concurrence. 351
The Court nonetheless reconsidered and overruled Schwinn,
affirming the Ninth Circuit on grounds that were broader than
necessary. 352

In the same way, the Alston Court could have reconsidered and
rejected the sports league exemption, even if both parties were
content to take the exemption as given. The Court would next have
had to determine whether the restraints might produce redeeming
virtues or, in the alternative, whether such restraints were "ancillary"
to what all conceded was a valid joint venture. The Court could have
decided, contrary to the view of this author, that purported benefits
of the restraints before it did not constitute redeeming virtues under
the NPR standard. 353 The Court could have also embraced one or
more virtues but rejected others. 3 54 Whichever course the Court
decided to take would have provided important guidance to lower
courts about how to discern whether a purported virtue is
"redeeming" and thus whether a particular restraint is unlawful per
se.

In the alternative, the Court could have ordered reargument and
directed the parties to address the validity of the exemption that the
NCAA Court announced without briefing on the matter. 355 Such an
order could have also directed the parties to address, again for the
348. See Jin-Taek Hong & Daniel T. McCarthy, National Collegiate Athletic
Association v. Alston, CORNELL L. ScH. SUP. CT. BULL., https://www.law.cornell.
edu/supct/cert/20-512 (last visited Oct. 26, 2021) (discussing "[q]uestions as
[firamed for the Court by the [p]arties").
349. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-59 (1977).
350. Id. at 41-42 (describing the Ninth Circuit's narrow rationale for rejecting
per se the condemnation location clause before it).
351. Id. at 59-66 (White, J., concurring).
352. Id. at 57-59.
353. Cf. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 416 F.3d 29, 37-38
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (concluding that restraints that apparently combatted free riding
could not produce cognizable antitrust benefits).
354. For instance, the Court could have held that preserving the amateur
nature of college football was a redeeming virtue, while preserving competitive
balance was not.
355. See Meese, supra note 12, at 84.
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first time in the Supreme Court, whether the NCAA's horizontal
restraints imposed on student-athlete compensation may produce
redeeming virtues and, if so, the nature of such potential virtues.
Unfortunately, the Alston Court took neither course, leaving for
another day, or perhaps never, a definitive and well-informed
resolution by the Court of one or both issues.
De novo treatment of the question would have placed the
resulting answer on a more solid footing, better integrating this
conclusion within the Court's larger post-Sylvania framework for
In
determining whether purported virtues are redeeming. 356
particular, the Court could identify the exact nature and limits of the
market failure(s), if any, that unbridled rivalry for players might
produce.
If the Court had determined that the challenged restraints may
produce redeeming virtues and thus survive per se condemnation, it
could then have opined on how to assess such agreements under the
rule of reason. Instead of asking how to make out a prima facie case
in a vacuum, as it did in NCAA, or parroting the approach taken by
the Ninth Circuit, the Court could have tailored this methodology to
the nature of the redeeming virtues that the restraints might
For instance, if the restraints survive per se
produce.3 57
condemnation because they might produce technological efficiencies,
proof that they altered prices compared to a nonrestraint baseline
should establish a prima facie case. On the other hand-and as seems
more likely-they survive because unchecked bidding for the services
of student-athletes could result in a market failure and suboptimal
product quality; proof that the restraint reduces student-athlete
compensation below what an unbridled market would produce should
not itself establish a prima facie case. Such evidence would instead
be equally consistent with a conclusion that the restraint eliminates
this market failure and restores compensation to optimal levels. 358
The Court could have also explained that proof that the restraint
produces significant benefits by overcoming a market failure should
rebut any presumption that such benefits coexist with harms if the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case based solely on actual
detrimental effects.35 9 Absent such coexistence, the rationale for
balancing a restraint's harms against benefits evaporates, as does the

356. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 571 U.S. 877,
913-14 (2007) (describing various benefits that minimum resale price
maintenance can create); Nat'l Soc'y of Pro. Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
679-80, 699 (1978) (rejecting defendants' claim that propensity of restraint to
enhance product safety qualified as a redeeming virtue).
357. See supraPart II (explaining that methodology for establishing a prima
facie case should depend upon the nature of redeeming virtues that prevent per
se condemnation).
358. See supra notes 180-204 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 315-16 and accompanying text.
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rationale for the less restrictive alternative test.36 0 After all, if the
presence of benefits rebuts the presumption of harm, then there is
nothing to balance against such benefits. Nor is there any reason to
assume that the challenged restraint is "restrictive" in any
meaningful antitrust sense or to ask whether there is a "less
restrictive" means of achieving the same benefits.
To be sure, the approach advocated here would have required the
Court to abandon some previous pronouncements regarding the scope
of the per se rule and the method of conducting rule of reason analysis.
However, as noted earlier, Standard Oil's rule of reason contemplates
that courts will adjust Section 1 doctrine in light of evolving economic
theory that alters judicial understanding of the consequences of
challenged restraints. 361 For instance, overbroad applications of the
per se rule in decisions such as Topco, which NCAA purported to
reaffirm, ignored then-emerging developments in economic theory
recognized in Sylvania, establishing that such restraints could
interbrand
enhance
and thus
failures
market
overcome
Extension of these theoretical insights to the
competition.36 2
horizontal context would require rejection of Topco and similar
decisions and concomitant contraction of the scope of the per se rule.
These same developments in economic theory also have
implications for rule of reason analysis. Judicial and agency reliance
on actual detrimental effects to establish a prima facie case ignores
developments in economic theory, concluding that many restraints
that survive per se condemnation do so because they overcome a
market failure and suboptimal prices, for instance. Here again,
Standard Oil's admonition to adjust doctrine in light of evolving
"economic conceptions" requires adjustment of antitrust doctrine
despite any considerations of stare decisis. Thus, the Court should
disavow decisions holding that proof of actual detrimental effects
necessarily suffice to establish a prima facie case, regardless of why
The Court should also
restraints avoid per se condemnation.
repudiate the outmoded judicial assumptions that benefits of such
restraints necessarily coexist with harms and the related
requirements that courts "balance" purported harms against actual
benefits. By correcting these and other errors, the Alston Court could
have ensured a more coherent Section 1 jurisprudence that better
reflects the teachings of modern economic theory. Unfortunately,
such corrections will have to take place some other time.

360. See supra notes 317-21 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 36-68 and accompanying text; see also Bus. Elecs. Corp.
v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 732 (1988) ("The Sherman Act adopted the
term 'restraint of trade' along with its dynamic potential.").
362. See supra Subparts I.B.1 & I.B.2.

